

# ESSAYS ON THE RĠVEDA

AND

OTHER TOPICS

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD

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POONA : 1932

Published by —

Mr. D. K. Tamhankar, B. A. (Hons.)  
88, Deccan College, Poona.

✧ (First Edition : 500 Copies)


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Printed by :—

Mr. A. V. Patvardhan, B. A.,  
at the Aryabhushan Press,  
House No. 935/2 Bhamburda Peth,  
Poona City.



THE AUTHOR



HUMBLY DEDICATED  
TO  
PRIN. H. G RAWLINSON,  
MA, IES,  
FOR HIS SYMPATHY  
WITH  
—THE AUTHOR.

## FOREWORD.

It is not an uncommon experience among the student-world that a student gets some of the best suggestions in the art of passing his examinations from his friends who are either studying with him in the same class or who have just gone through the ordeal. The reason for this is not very difficult to be seen. The teacher or the professor, however able, painstaking and careful he may be in explaining the texts from the standpoint of the student's level, can never completely attain it from the very nature of the fact that teachers are teachers and students are students. It is the clever student who knows his job properly that can immediately pick up useful hints and material for his examination from the mass of words that is pouring forth from the lips of his teacher. Having obtained the material he tries to digest it and having picked up the hints he tries to supplement and develop them by further reading and thinking. No wonder then that the guidance and note-books of such a student are extremely helpful to his class-friends and to his juniors at the nick of time.

The present work is an attempt of this type from an intelligent, careful and critical student, Mr. D. K. Tamhankar B. A. (Hons), who during his studies in Sanskrit Honours in the B. A. class last year and the year before, made a study of this nature and who being aware of the difficulties of the students thought of

publishing the following essays hoping thereby to extend a *helping hand* to those students who may have to appear at the above examination in the next few years

The first four essays on the R̥gveda cover between them almost everything which an average student ought to know about that interesting, but from the stand-point of students rather dull, subject. For this purpose, he has tapped the sources (both English and German) which are not only beyond the range and capacity of all students but which would cost a good deal of their time to summarize them in the manner they are done here. The Anthropological back-ground which we find in these four essays to the explanations of various ancient phenomena, for instance, the deities of the R̥gveda, their functions and nature, etc is perhaps the *healthiest outlook* one would have while discussing subjects of this nature. The various theories on Sacrifice together with the details put forth in this volume are not only some of those which are most up-to-date and generally accepted by the learned orientalis-  
tists now-a-days, but they are so *interesting* that even a layman would like to read them with delight

As for the Sātraka Bhāṣya, most of the arguments of Śaṅkarācārya against Naiyāyikas and Bauddhas are analysed and summarized with precision and clearness. Next, the marvellous way in which the famous Ācārya handles the various conflicting Srutis (Vedāntic texts) is shown admirably, often comparing his statements with those of Rāmānuja and Vallabha. The much-discussed question of how far Sankara truly represents the Sātrakāra

is tackled last. On this point divergences of opinion do exist even now although it is established with tolerable certainty that Śāṅkara and the Sūtrakāra belonged to different schools of thought. Mr. Teliwala's paper which is also utilised for this purpose by our author, goes a bit too hard with the learned Acārya, and it is impossible to meet a few of his arguments successfully.

The last essay on the Arthasāstra gives an admirable summary of arguments from both sides (Indian and foreign) on this hotly-discussed question and adds a few *original ones*. The present writer finds it difficult to agree with the conclusion arrived at in this essay regarding the authorship of the work, and would like to see the question still open.

Here is, then, a *lucid and simple discussion* touching the subjects which the B. A. (Pass and Honours) students in Sanskrit of our University are required to study, excepting the subject of Alamkāra, and I have the greatest pleasure in wishing a very great success to this volume and in recommending it with all *emphasis* to the B. A. students in Sanskrit of our University.

Deccan College, }  
Poona  
August, 2, 32 }

T. N. DAVE.

the *Iṅveda* are exploited so much thoroughly by eminent scholars that very little scope is left for originality. What can be done anew is to treat the topics with a fresh outlook. And this I have done by examining various topics from the historical as well as the anthropological points of view. I will rest satisfied if the students and other scholars feel a sort of absorbing interest while going through the following pages.

Every attempt has been made to present the book in an elegant and attractive form. The text is interleaved so that students might record on them their own observations on the text as well as other parallel quotations. Coloured pages have been introduced to facilitate the demarcation of various sections in this book. Precaution is also taken to eliminate all sorts of mistakes in composing. Still an indulgent favour from the readers is solicited to correct the small inaccuracies that might have managed to creep in (*e. g.* on p 2, 120; p. 5, 13; p 16, 121; p. 17, 117; etc.) I have also to modify my view expressed on p. 39, ll 8-10. The scholars have no doubt come to the conclusion I have stated but that is established more by other facts such as the human skulls found in the excavations. They (*i. e.* the scholars) have *tried* to interpret the script but have *not* yet interpreted it fully.

I have now to perform the sweetest part of my work and that is to acknowledge my indebtedness to several persons for their help. Principal Rawlinson, under whose sympathetic guidance I passed my two years in the Deccan College, was kind enough ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> show the book being



dedicated to him. Dr. Dave, who in a short space of time infused a spirit of liveliness among the students and rightly commanded their respectful love, has put me under great obligations by writing a sympathetic foreword to my book and by furnishing me with scholarly information of the excavations at Mahan-jo-Daro. I am also thankful to my loyal friend Mr. V. N. Bhide of the Fergusson College for having gone through the proofs and made valuable suggestions to render the book more useful from the students' point of view. Last, but not least, I have to thank the Manager and the Staff of the Āryabhūṣana Press for their quick and efficient despatch of work. Especially the civility and the extreme precaution of Mr. Barve to keep the customer contented even at the cost of some pecuniary loss to the Press is praiseworthy and reflects a good credit on the institution of which he is a member.

Finally, I request the student-world to take full advantage of my efforts and to encourage me by their warm support.

88, Deccan College, }  
Poona; August 3, 32. }

D. K. TAMHANKAR.

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## 1. THE STUDY OF THE RĠVEDA.

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The title of the essay is very comprehensive and comprises many topics connected with the 'study' of the Rġveda. We shall discuss severally all such relevant topics one by one.

### (a) Its Form.

If a book means a work written by one man, implying unity of time and ideas, the RV. is far from being a book. It is rather a compilation composed of several books which can be individually distinguished from each other.

The RV. Samhitā, as it has come to us, contains 1028 hymns (including the 11 Valakhilya hymns). There are two current ways of dividing this Rk. Samhitā viz. into (1) Mandalas, Anuvākas, Suktas and Rks; and (2) Astakas, Adhyāyas, Vargas and Rks. According to the first way, there are ten Mandalas, each Mandala being successively sub-divided into several Anuvākas, each Anuvāka containing a number of Suktas. According to the second, there are eight Astakas, each Astaka containing eight Adhyāyas. Each Adhyāya contains several Vargas which are usually made up of five Rks though their number at times varies. The first method is older one and more natural. The second is unimportant since mere convenience of study is at its root. This sort of division is popular with the

Vaidikas with whom a Varga is the measure of a lesson. But it is purely mechanical and comparatively modern.

Every hymn has a seer, a deity, a metre and Viniyoga, without the knowledge of which the meaning of the hymn cannot properly be understood, nor can the hymn be efficiently applied. Kātyāyana's 'Sarvānukramani' furnishes us with all these requisites.

Out of these ten Mandalas, the seven, viz II to VII, are called 'Family Books' and are respectively ascribed to the following Seers: II Grtsamada, III Viśvāmitra, IV Vāmadava, V Atri, VI Bhṛadvājas, VII Vasistha. The hymns belonging to these Books are homogeneous and they are composed either by the aforesaid Seers or their descendants. Mandalas I, VIII, IX, X contain several groups of hymns which are composed by various Seers. These Mandalas are generally held to be later additions. The 'Family Books' are not only characterised by a common Seer but also have some definite principles underlying the sequence of the hymns. As a rule, the first group of hymns in each Mandala is addressed to Agni, the second to Indra, and the rest to Miscellaneous Deities arranged according to the number of hymns addressed to each. Further the arrangement of the hymns in each of these groups proceeds on the principle that every following hymn has a lesser number of Rks than the preceding one, with only a few exceptions about whose character there prevails a doubt. Some of the 'Family Books' are characterised also by the recurring refrains at the end of each hymn. Thus, the third and the

seventh Mandalas have respectively got the following refrains.

III इहृददेम विदधेऽस्यीराः ।

VII द्युयं पात स्वास्तिभिः सदा नः ।

Though the RV. is a vast compilation of 1028 hymns still all of these are not original. The later poets of the RV. imitated and often quoted the phraseology of the older ones thus giving rise to many repetitions. Prof. Bloomfield has with great pains shown that 2400 pādas are repeated on the average nearly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times making a total of 6000 pādas. Adding to this the repeated refrain lines and others, the total comes to about 8000 pādas which is hardly less than  $\frac{1}{5}$  of the entire Rgvedic collection. But this repetition was not at all unnatural. We do expect to find more or less striking similitudes between hymns addressed to the same divinity, because the Older poets exploited the themes so exhaustively that the later poets had to borrow something from them. Once he was to borrow, it was a mere question of degree how closely he will follow them. Moreover, the later poet wanted to lend an air of oldness to his hymns—a purpose which could be achieved by using old expressions and maxims. In these repetitions, it is a fundamental fact that a given verse-unit has the same meaning everywhere, except in so far as it is altered verbally to suit a different theme or a different connection. These repetitions are, however, useful to the modern critical Student of research. A given passage which is obscure in one connection may be successfully interpreted on account of its occurrence in different connections.

Not all the hymns belong to the same period of composition. There are clear signs of 'Earlier' and 'Later' hymns. The written hymns of the RV. as a body are largely epigonal (i.e. born after a long period of oral production of the hymns). So it is quite natural that the older and the later portions should be fused together. Yet there are some tests to find out which hymns are older and which the later. They are as follows:—

(1) Wrong grammatical sequence of words, tautology, ellipsis, solecisms, imperfect metre—abundance of these indicates the oldness of a hymn.

(2) The thought contained in the hymns. Wherever we find traces of modern philosophy (e.g. questions like 'who am I?' 'Who is the creator of this Universe?' and so on) we can safely suspect the passage to be a later addition. Also Mandukas I and X are conceded to be later ones because they contain hymns and Sociological interest e.g. those that describe marriage ceremony and funeral rites. Similarly hymns speaking of the greatness of Vedic studies, importance of Agriculture, miseries of a gambler, origin of castes (e.g. the Purusa hymn X. 90) and the like may be labelled 'Later'.

(3) Use of older and later grammatical forms and words; e.g. 'Visva' is an old word while 'Sarva' is comparatively later. The following are the instances of a few old grammatical forms.

- (i) The instr. sing. in ई, e.g. अचिन्त, ऊती, शमी, तप्ती.
- (ii) Unaugmented forms of historical tenses, e.g. तसु, तसुव, मसु.

(iii) The infinitives in ए, e. g. पीतये, वीतये, रातये.

(iv) The pronouns, स्य and त्व.

(v) Duels ending in ; locative singulars in the same form as the nominative, e. g. व्योमन्.

(4) The last and best test is the confession of the fact by the hymns themselves.

The following are instances in point.

(1) ये च पुंश्च कपयः ये च नृणाः इन्द्र ब्रह्माणि जनयन्त विप्राः ।

(VII. 22. 9)

(2) ते विदि पुंश्च कवयो गृध्रान्तः (VII. 53. 1)

(3) भूरी चक्र मरुतः विभ्याणि उक्थानि । (VII. 56. 23)

(4) प्र या मन्वानि ऋचसे नवानि इतानि वस्य जुहुयन्मिमानि । (VII. 61. 6)

The following are the metres generally met with in the Rgveda.

(1) गायत्री	8.	8.	8.	
(2) उर्विगृ	8.	8.	12	
(3) पुरोडाशिक	12.	8.	8	
(4) ऋजु	8.	12.	8	
(5) अनुष्टुप्	8.	8.	8.	8.
(6) इरुती	8.	8.	12.	8.
(7) मत्तगृहती	12.	8.	12.	8.
(8) पंक्ति	8.	8.	8.	8. 8.
(9) प्रस्तारपंक्ति	12.	12.	8.	8.
(10) विराम	10.	10, or 11.	11.	11.



(11) त्रिष्टुप्	11,	11,	11,	11.
(12) जगती	12,	12,	12,	12.

Gāyatri, Tristubh, and Jagati are the most popular with the Vedic Poets. Anuṣṭubh is a later metre. The alternate Rks in Brhati and Satobhrati metres—the odd ones in Brhati and the even ones in Satobhrati—form a strophic metre of Bārhata type (also cf. ककुम् प्रयाग). Other combinations of metres are also found. Some metres are specially used in connection with a particular god, e.g. त्रिष्टुप् in the case of Indra.

Now we shall turn to the text of the RV. Samhitā. Through the religious zeal of the people, the Samhitā text is preserved very carefully and therefore possesses an extraordinary degree of authenticity. Even to-day we find Pandits who can recite the whole of the RV. Samhitā without the slightest mistake of accent. Kātyāyana's 'Sarvānukramanī' supplies the following details. The Samhitā contains 1028 hymns, 10402 verses, 153826 words and 432000 syllables! The Pada-text, which separates each word of the Samhitā, was prepared very soon after the Samhitā itself. There are also other Pāthas such as the Jātāpātha and the Ghanapātha—repeating previous and latter words—which make it impossible for any one to interpolate spurious matter without detection. Lastly, that wonderful Guard-'Sarvānukramanī'—not only gives us the seer, the deity, the metre and the Vinīyoga of every hymn but also gives the number of Rks in each hymn and the beginning of the

first Rk. It is no wonder that the Samhitā text has preserved its purity under these keenest precautions.

(b) Methods of interpreting the R̥gveda.

There are many obscure words and phrases in the RV. the meaning of which cannot be determined except without a most careful search. There are two schools of interpreting the RV. viz. the old traditional school and the school of modern critics.

The following is a short account of the former school.

(1) The Brāhmanas at times serve as an illuminating commentary on the Vedas. But their usefulness in this respect is minimized due to the following fact. The Brāhmanas, being mainly concerned with the cult of sacrifices, were already removed from the spirit of the composers of the R̥gvedic hymns. They try to harness most of the hymns to the yoke of sacrifices. Thus they explain the line 'वसो देवाय हरिः प्रियं' as "Ka is Prajapati: unto him let us offer worship with oblation." The original inquiring tone is totally annihilated.

(2) The Nighantus are the oldest Vedic lexicographical material. But they cover very little portion of the R̥gveda and consequently become less serviceable to that extent.

(3) The Nirukta of Yāska is the earliest continuous Vedic commentary. He is a learned interpreter working with the materials which scholarship had accumulated before his age. In all cases of difficulty, his method of

interpretation is based on etymology. But as we shall see in the sequel, this method does not always give the correct meaning. Yāska himself mentions seventeen predecessors who worked in the same field.

(4) Sāyana's commentary. The 'Vedārtihaprakāśa' of Sāyana is a running commentary practically explaining every word of every Rk. It also explains most of the grammatical and metrical irregularities. He commonly follows Yāska though in several cases he disagrees with him. He at times tries to explain away the obscure Rg-vedic myths by adducing legends from the Purāṇas. This from the chronological point of view seems extremely improbable. Sāyana almost resents leaving any words or Rks unexplained. Hence dogmatic assertions are made without any qualification. He scarcely waits to ask himself whether the meaning he proposes for a particular word in one context is justified by the occurrences of the word in other passages. The spirit of inquiry is wanting.

The following is the gist of the Modern Scientific (critical) method of interpreting the RV. The essential nature of this method is the patient exhaustive collection, co-ordination, sifting and evaluation of facts bearing on the subject of investigation. This spade-work is very laborious and tedious. But European Scholars have done it most admirably. Prof. Bloomfield, for example, has collected all the repetitions in the RV. and arranged them in the order of Mandalas giving all the cross-references. Thus at one glance we can know how many times a Pāda or a Rk is repeated in different contexts. The same scholar

has composed a Concordance giving all the Rks in their alphabetical order. But his ambition was to prepare a word-Concordance for the Rgvada.

Prof. Macdonell and Keith have composed an 'Index of the Vedic Deities and Proper Names.' That indefatigable Scholar Roth wrote out his stupendous 'Petersburg Dictionary' in seven volumes. This Dictionary explains all the Vedic words with due regard to the occurrences of the words in other contexts. The work of the actual translation of the RV. is done both by English and German Scholars and also by a few scholars of other nationalities. But the works of German Scholars have a ring of soundness and through study about them, (see in this connection 'Vedic Studies' by Pischel and Geldner and 'Textual and Exegetical Notes on the Rgvada' by Oldenberg.) Prof. Macdonell has passed a shrewd remark in this connection. He says:—'The sole aim here being the attainment of truth, it is a positive advantage that the translators of ancient sacred books should be outsiders rather than the Native Custodians of such writings. The latter could not escape from religious bias.' In a way, the statement is true, but we wonder whether the learned Professor would like to allow the same freedom to Indian Scholars in the interpretation of the Bible! The point to be noted is that we must never allow our mind being influenced by the thought that we must, in any case, attach some meaning to a Rk or Rks. We may come across certain Rks through which it is impossible to penetrate by means of the present means of Scholarship.

In such cases, the best way would be to leave such Rks frankly unexplained.

The modern Vedic scholar has got the following sources of knowledge which were not available for the Traditional scholars. They are: (1) The Avestā (2) Comparative Philology (3) Comparative Mythology and (4) the Anthropology of Ancient peoples.

(1) Avestā is capable of elucidating questions of language, mythology and the Cult in the RV. For instance, Avestic Mithra proves that Mitra is a Sun-god—a fact which was not clear from the RV. itself. So also the Avestic Ahura indicates that the term Asura originally applied to the highest gods and only later came to mean demon. Haoma shows that the preparation and the cult of Soma were pre-Indian.

(2) Comparative Philology not only throws direct light on the origin and the meaning of many Vedic words but negatively supplies a check on wild and impossible etymologies. For example, Yāska explains the word 'Saravatati' as 'sarvāsu karmatatiṣu.' But we know from cognate languages that the word is a derivative and not a compound. Thus, *sarva* (Lat. *salvo*) with the suffix 'tati' (or *tat*) means 'wholeness' or 'complete welfare.' Similarly 'spas' taken by Sayana to mean 'sprs' or 'badh' has parallels in Avestan *spas*, Latin *spec-io*, old German *—spehon*, English *spy*.

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Yama ( Vedic )	=	Yima ( Av. )
Dyaus-pitar	=	Jupiter ( Lat. )
Mātariśvan	=	Prometheus ( Greek )

(4) Anthropology of Ancient peoples gives us an idea of what the Rgvedic people must be in stature and habits. While actually translating the hymns, the following hints should be borne in mind

(1) The interpretation of the portion that was not understood by the commentators must be based on an exhaustive examination of the RV. itself by a complete connection and comparison of the facts it contains.

(2) The very foundation of a scientific translation must be a strict adherence to the rules of Vedic Grammar.

(3) Due attention must also be paid to etymology, context, Vedic accent, and Vedic metre

(4) Since the text of the RV is preserved with extreme precaution, conjectural emendations of the text and the rejection of the Pads-pātha should be resorted to only in extreme cases

Comparing these two schools of interpreting the RV, one would be inclined to adhere to the latter. There is, however, one glaring defect in the same. Occidental scholars, while basing their interpretation on reason ignore the tradition to a great extent. This is, however, not very prudent. One has specially to take into consideration the traditional information while interpreting the

old sacred books. With this necessary correction, the second method becomes wholly acceptable.

### (c) The Religion of the Rgveda.

Religion is the conception of divine and supernatural powers entertained by man. It springs from the sense of dependence of human welfare on these powers. At this stage it is necessary to give a detailed note on the conception of the Rgvedic gods. But we request our readers to turn to our next essay on the nature of the Rgvedic gods for this purpose. For the present, we only state that the Rgvedic gods are the personifications of the forces of Nature and more or less reflect the conditions through which the Rgvedic Indians passed. Now we have to define the attitude of the Rgvedic man towards the gods.

The happy, successful and therefore optimistic Vedic Indian looked on gods as beneficent beings and bestowers of prosperity. A Rgvedic devotee was never affected by the higher ideals such as that of the disinterested devotion for God—(Niskāma—bhakti). He was a man of the world, most practical in his dealings with the gods. He offered rich offerings to them but in return demanded of them long life, prosperity, warlike sons, conquest of enemies, freedom from diseases and abundance of food and drink. Thus, reciprocity, frank and unconditional, becomes an accepted motive.

The conception of godhead is primitive and crude. A god is conceived to be someone very like a tribal Head who could be pleased with meat, drink and other offerings.



How can we expect the Rgvedic gods alone to be the exception to the rule that man fashions his gods after himself? Rgvedic Indians were essentially an active, energetic, warrior people, in the main prosperous and contented with life. Thus their Indra also is a warlike and jovial god. He is a great drinker and a mighty eater. So we find the Rgvedic devotees on terms of familiarity and friendship with gods. This familiarity, however, removed all the traces of the deep sense of piety in their hearts. There could not, in their hearts, be any reverential fear for the gods. It is an essential distinction between the religion of the Veda and many other religions that there is no great stress laid on the moral qualities of the gods and that the sense of sin is only very feebly represented in the hymns. Sin is conceived to be something which sticks to a man, which confers upon him a taint even as a disease does, and it is to be fought against in the same way as a disease. The reason is not far to seek. Rgvedic persons admittedly represent the earlier stages in the evolution of the society. It behoves them that they are more worldly and unaffected by the higher types of human feelings. How can a primitive society be expected to make much of morality and its various channels?

In the religion, as opposed to philosophy, the practice or the ritual occupies the most prominent place. A philosopher, who on the pulpit solemnly preaches the doctrine of truth, can afford himself to be a liar of the first water, but for the devotee, very little is left over and above the ritual. Religion is no theory. A religionist has to show

by his actions what he can do for his god and religion. The following are a few observations on the ritual in the religion of the Rgveda.

The first fact that strikes us is that the ritual of the Rgvedic religion is dominated by priests. Another trait which confronts us is that the religion of the Rgveda, from the ritualistic point of view, is a religion of upper classes. It presupposes an extensive household and a wealthy patron who can afford to spend large sums on the costly materials of sacrifices and the largesses of the Brāhmanas. The most usual medium for the communion with gods was the sacrificial Fire. Milk in various forms, barley and other corn, Soma, and even beasts were generally the materials burnt in that sacred Fire. We, however, refrain from giving a detailed information of sacrifices in this place since we have discussed that topic exhaustively in our fourth essay. Anthropomorphism (i. e. the conception of the gods in human form) was so vague and hazy that there is no mention of the images of gods or temples in the Rgveda.

Before closing this section we propose to reply an interesting question. The Dharmasāstras unanimously declare that the Vedas are the source of Dharma. How far is their statement correct? We reply that the statement is only partially true. The word 'Dharma' as used by the Dharmasāstras (e. g. in 'Vedokhilo dharmamulam') means the sacred rites and the rules of conduct for the four Varnas and Āśramas. Now the Rgveda itself lays down no cut and dry rules for either of these. It contains

incidental references to various topics that fall under the domain of Dharmaśāstra. For example, there is one hymn in which a brotherless maiden laments because none is willing to marry her. This indirect allusion gave rise to the rule of the Dharmaśāstra that 'None shall marry a brotherless maiden.' The tenth Mandala also gives some information of the marriage and funeral rites.

#### (d) Mythology of the R̥gveda.

A myth actually arises when the human imagination interprets a natural event as an action of a personified being resembling the human agent. The basis of these myths is the primitive attitude of mind which regards all Nature as an aggregate of animated entities. The natural phenomenon begins to fade out of the picture, as its place is taken by a detailed representation of human passions. Sometimes the web of myths becomes impenetrable since secondary myths are woven around the original myth and so on. The 'Indra and Vritra' myth is a typical instance in point.

Since the present essay is written from the examination point of view, we propose to give a detailed description of only a few important deities (mostly adapted from Macdonell's 'Vedic Mythology').

(1) Varuṇa. No sinner can escape punishment at the hands of Varuṇa. The penitent sinner pleads to Varuṇa in most touching words. The charge that the Vedic hymns lack in a deep sense of piety is rendered nugatory at least in the case of hymns addressed to Varuṇa. Varuṇa—

times in the RV. He is preeminently addicted to Soma. Before killing Vritra he is said to have drunk thirty lakes of Soma. He is spoken of as issued out of the sides of his mother. Maruts are his helpers in warfare.

More often Indra is spoken of as the one compassionate helper, as the deliverer and advocate of his worshippers. His friend is never slain or conquered. The gift of cows (Gopati) and wealth (Vasupati) is specially applied to him. Energetic action is characteristic of him while passive sway is distinctive of Varuna.

He is primarily the thunder god and a dominant deity of the middle region. The word 'Indra' is derived from the word 'Indu', a water-drop. Thus Indra is also connected with rain. He is not described as possessing the moral elevation and grandeur of Varuna. He is very sensual and rich gifts can turn him from one devotee to another. He is more human in his habits and jubilan mood.

We can trace a sort of degradation of Varuna's supremacy and the ascendancy of Indra on the other hand in the Rgveda itself. The later parts of the Rgveda show marked partiality towards Indra. For example, the tenth Mandala contains forty five hymns to Indra while Varuna has none. In the Brāhmanic and Paurānic periods, the supremacy of Varuna is transferred to Indra to a great extent. If Varuna represents morality and Indra sensuousness, how are we to account for the change of supremacy from Varuna to Indra? It may be that the Vedic Indians were first afraid of the breach of moral laws but later on

hymns are on a par with the Hebrew Psalms so far as the feeling of reverential fear for God is concerned. Law and Order are always associated with him (Dhrtavrata). He has spies around him and none can deceive him. He is a king and even a universal king (Samrāj). The attributes Māyin and Asura are peculiar to him. As a moral governor he stands above any other deity.

Varuna's place in Nature is much debated. The etymological explanation (rt. 'var') makes him the deity of the sky, the all-encompasser. Sāyana takes him to be the 'enveloper' or the 'confiner' of the wicked with his bonds. Many other explanations are offered but none is convincing. This diversity of opinions is due to the fact that the almost perfected anthropomorphism in Varuna's case completely shrouds his naturalistic basis. As regards his origin, it is certain that he does not belong to Indo-European period but is borrowed during Indo-Irānian period from the Semitic people.

(2) Indra Indra is the favourite national god of the Vedic Indians. Nearly one-fourth of the total numbers of hymns ( i. e. 250 ) are addressed to him. His form is almost anthropomorphic and his myths exceed those of all other gods. The gigantic size of Indra is dwelt upon in many passages.

The Vajra is the weapon exclusively appropriate to Indra. Śakra, Śacivat, Śatakratu, Ajara, Pūrvya are some of his common attributes. Apsujit and Purabhid are his exclusive epithets. He has become famous on account of the Vritra myth. He is called 'Vritrahan' for seventy

came to believe that real life consists in hoisterousness and the satisfaction of the impulses of Nature. As the years rolled on they further thought that men were not so much at the mercy of gods as they first believed and that the sacrifices and offerings could pacify the anger of even the most wrathful god.

(3) *Āśvinā* Fifty hymns are sung in honour of *Āśvinā*. They are always true (*Satyadharmānu*) and never deceitful (*Nāsatyā*). They are often called the sons of Heaven (*Divo napātā*). They are the specially favourite deities of the Vedic Indians because they are essentially humane. Their help is unfailing. Their extraordinary sympathy for the suffering humanity made them wander (*Pravāsā*) through the human tribes. Other gods did not like their too close a contact with the mortals and debarred them from participating of nectar. *Āśvinā*, however, trickily managed to resume their divine status by learning the *Madhuvidyā* from the sage *Madhyac*. *Ātharvāna*. *Āśvinā*'s position is also unique from another point of view. *Varuṇa* was much dreaded of on account of his chastising spirit while, on the other hand, *Indra* had lost his prestige on account of his looseness of morals and unsteadiness of help. *Āśvinā* had none of these shortcomings and hence, later on, became the most beloved deities of the Vedic Indians.

A red path (*Rudravartmani*) and a golden path (*Hiranyavartmani*) are peculiar to them. They are most closely connected with honey. An offering of honey was sure to drag them to the devotee from whatever - far-off place

Their name implies only the possession of horses, there being no evidence to show that they are so called because they ride on horses. Apart from their character as helpers, healers, and wonder-workers, their general beneficence is often praised. They are the divine physicians and can work miracles in the domain of medicine and surgery. There is a host of Aśvinā's proteges, the hymn I 116 alone describing twenty-six of them.

At the yoking of their car, Uṣas is born. Thus their relative time seems to be between the dawn and the sunrise. They are connected with the Sun in another way also. Many of the hymns fondly describe the marriage of Sūryā, the daughter of the Sun, with Aśvinā. There is a great doubt as regards their identification with natural phenomena. The following pairs are proposed by the scholars for the identification of Aśvinā (1) Anthropomorphised forms of solar phenomena (2) Heaven and Earth. (3) The Sun and the Moon. (4) Two Kings, performers of holy acts (5) Day and Night. (6) The twilight and the morning stars. Macdonell prefers the last pair. We, however, are not yet convinced of any of these. As regards their origin, it appears not unlikely that Aśvinā date from the Indo-European period in character though not in time.

(4) Uṣas. Uṣas is the most graceful creation of Vedic poets. There is no more charming figure in the descriptive religious lyrics of any other literature. The brightness of her form has not been obscured by priestly speculation nor has the imagery as a rule been marred by

references to sacrifices. The reader is sure to be charmed by the flamboyant descriptions of Usas. She is always called a beautiful maiden ( Bhadrā yosā. ) Like a lady bathing in the standing position, she stands in front of men for being seen by them. Like an adolescent virgin who is conscious of her beauty, Usas displays the splendour of her bosoms ( nirinṭe apsah ) unto young men. These sensuous descriptions of Usas make us think that they are rather the descriptions of a young prostitute with whose graces, it is not unlikely, the Vedic poets were familiar. But we are saved from accepting this extreme view by the fact that Usas is also spoken of as born of noble lineage ( Sujātā ).

'The Daughter of Heaven' ( Duhitar divah ) is her standing epithet. The maiden awakens all the world and infuses it with life and vigour. Shortening the ages of men she shines forth daily. Usas is borne on a shining car. She is said to ride also on hundred chariots. She is resplendent, golden-hued and immortal. She is characteristically bountiful. The personification in the case of Usas is very slight. As her name shows, she represents the phenomenon of dawn. In her descriptions the poet always seems to be conscious of the natural dawn. She is in fact half a maiden and half the dawn.

### (c) The Philosophy of the R̥gveda.

Philosophy is the reason employed upon certain definite topics which are normally three, (1) Man (2) God and (3) the World. Philosophy speculates upon the mutual relations of these. Under the title of 'Religion' we have



discussed the relation of man and god; now we shall see whether the Rgvedic Indians had any idea of the relation between God and the world. In the first place we must remember that the Rgvedic Indians represent the earlier stages in the evolution of human race. Naturally, mature reasoning faculty which is so essential for philosophic speculation cannot be expected of them. Their utter simplicity, sometimes amounting to silliness, resembles the babblings of a child. For example, Vedic Seers ask questions such as (i) How does the black cow yield white milk? (ii) How does the ocean not increase in bulk even though so many rivers flow into it? or (iii) Why does the Moon not fall from the sky though unsupported? In the Rgveda we shall find unsophisticated poetry with fresh pastoral similes but not the dry light of reason which is the *sine qua non* of philosophy. The reason of the primitive man was not so much polished as to spin out the theories of creation or to trace the cause of the world. Nor can we expect the nomadic tribes to waste (?) their (invaluable?) time on such involved topics.

Does the Rgveda, then, not contain any traces of philosophy? We cannot reply the question in the negative. Our above arguments hold good so far as the older parts of the Rgveda are concerned. The later parts (e. g. Mandalas I and X) do contain some philosophical hymns. In the hymn X. 72 we get a curious account of the origin of gods. The famous Purusa-sūkta (X. 90) conceives the cosmic Purusa from whom the various things in this world spring up. This hymn is also important from the view point of the caste-system. X. 121 is also a cosmological hymn.

The highest philosophical thought reached in the R.V. is the query 'Does even the God know whence the creation came?' (Ko addhā veda? X. 129 The Nāeadiye Sūkta) In the same Mandala we come across certain hymns in which the seers ask such deep questions as 'Who am I?', 'Where am I to go?' and so on. The tendency towards monism seems also to have laid its foundation; e.g. one poet says 'ekam hi santam viprā bahudha vedanta'. Thus, though the Rgveda itself does not contain any well-reasoned-out system of philosophy, it no doubt serves as the basis of the philosophical systems (darsanas) developed in the Upanisadic period.

We have thus discussed all the important topics connected with the study of the Rgveda. In the next essay we are going to furnish a detailed account of the conception and the evolution of the idea of godhead in the Rgveda.

## 2. THE NATURE OF THE RGVEDIC GODS.

The theme has been exploited by many learned scholars more or less in the same way. We are therefore going to treat the subject with a fresh historical outlook. The more important part of our essay would be to trace the origin and the evolution of the idea of godhead. Our field also is limited since we are concerned only with the gods of the Rgveda.

The conception of gods, like that of religion, is one of the most primeval ideas which have ever struck the human oranium. The Rgveda being the earliest literary monument of the world is very useful for tracing the primitive ideas of godhead. In the Rgveda we are face to face with our unsophisticated forefathers babbling out their thoughts with utter simplicity and candour.

There are three prominent theories put forth by the scholars to explain the origin of godhead. We shall give the salient features of each and then decide what theory suits best the Rgvedic conception of godhead.

### (1) The Nature Theory of godhead

The primitive man found himself in an environment partly helpful and partly untoward and perilous. There were all about him 'friendly' objects and forces such as sunrise, rain, fire, dawn etc. Then there were other forces which were 'hostile' and perilous such as drought, darkness, and the mysterious causes of the blighting of crops, of

diseases, and of death. The friendly forces became gods and the hostile forces demons. All Nature thus divided into friendly and hostile forces was regarded as an aggregate of animated entities. Whereas the primitive man had no means to make himself proof against the inclemencies of Nature, it is quite likely that this animism presented itself at the beginning as only a haunting sense of the mystery and the potency of the world and its forces. This primitive attitude based on the experience of both harmful and helpful powers was made gradually more articulate through the interpretation of the powers of Nature as animals (theriomorphism) or as men (anthropomorphism). Thus the gods are but the personifications of the natural phenomena which must have appeared more graphically to the primitive man.

(a) The Ancestor-worship theory of godhead.

When a member of a family died, his brethren, in the primitive times, were struck with awe at the mysterious cause of his death. They were intimately connected with him for many years and so could not abolish his memory at once. On the other hand, the memory of the deceased person all the more haunted their mind. They thought that he must be visiting his home every day and that he would get angry if the members of his family acted in an improper manner. They were also afraid that the deceased person would in some way or other chastise them if they talked ill of him or did him any injustice. (Was this attitude responsible for the maxim "Never speak ill of the dead"?). This fear—sometimes not unmixed with respect—for the deceased ancestors induced the primitive

man to keep the Spirits of the dead contented. What would be the most natural way for him to accomplish this purpose? Unto what things would he proceed to show his respect? The idea of Spirits and other supra-sensuous entities cannot be expected of a primitive man. Some concrete things are quite necessary for him. These things would, in the first instance, be the remains of the dead persons such as hair, teeth or bones. The most natural way to please anybody was, in the opinion of the primitive man, to offer unto the person concerned such things as he himself liked best. The burning of incenses and offering of prayers belong to a later development of human psychology. Next as we have hinted above, even respect and love for the deceased ancestor may serve as the inspiring cause for giving him an exalted position. This case generally happens when the deceased person is the Head of some tribe or an outstanding personality in the eyes of his followers, (e. g. Kṛṣṇa in the case of the Vṛṣṇis). This hero-worship later on develops into god-worship. Thus the purport of this theory is that the origin of godhead lies in the worship of ancestors.

### (3) The Totemic Origin of godhead.

An important and wide-spread conception, partly religious in character, is 'Totemism'. A totem is a hereditary emblem (i. e. a symbol) of a tribe or clan or group of primitive people giving its name to the tribe etc. For instance, the ape was the symbol of the primitive people who helped Rāma. Similarly the serpent was the totem of the Nāga people referred to in the Mahābhārata.

Our point to show is that the Kapis or the Nagas were not themselves monkeys or serpents but rather their totems were monkeys and serpents respectively.

Totemism is founded on the belief that the human race, or, more frequently, the given clans or families derive their descent from animals or, in rare cases, from plants. Totemic names like 'Bear,' 'Wolf' carry traces of this belief into our times.

S. Reinach was the first scholar to put the theory of totemism on systematic lines. He insists that the traces of the reverence paid to animals are always to be accounted for in one simple way (1) Either at one time the animal was the god or (2) men revered animals by an excess of philanthropy, by a hypertrophy of the same instinct which made human Society a possibility. But on certain ceremonious occasions, the animal god was devoured in order to renew the tie of blood and spirit between the class and the animal which was then replaced by another specimen of the species, the species being the god, not the mere individual. The essential feature of a totemist community is that the men and women of that community conceive themselves severally to be related to some animal or plant and that they normally treat that animal or plant with great care and respect. These totems later on become the gods of these communities.

We have thus reviewed the main features of the three theories. Most of the scholars agree that the Nature theory of godhead is quite in keeping with the age and the spirit of the Rgveda. The second theory is comparatively a later one. As regards the third, there is not a

single reference in the Rgveda to any totem clan which sacramentally ate the totem animal or the plant. Thus the most essential feature of totemism in Reinach's theory does not even begin to appear in the Rgveda.

Having thus shown how the conception of godhead arises, we now set forth the salient features of the Rgvedic gods. In the first stage of godhead, the name of the thing is the name of the god, e. g. Dyaus, Agni, Sūrya, Usas and so on. We can see through these gods the origin from which they sprang. This 'transparency' of the Vedic pantheon is a unique feature of the Rgvedic gods. These *prima facie* Nature-gods are called 'Special' gods. The more a special god annexed the territory of his neighbours and the more fully emancipated he became from the thralldom of his own 'primitive Nature-significance,' the more completely personalized he became. Hence in the case of Dyaus or Prthivi the personification is very rudimentary, whereas Varuna and Indra are the most personalized gods of the Vedic pantheon. With few exceptions, anthropomorphism was so vague and hazy that there is no mention of either images or temples in the Rgveda. This haziness results in what we call 'arrested personification' which is the very genius of Vedic religion. Vedic gods are scarcely more than half person, their other half being still an active force of Nature. Whoever the god, his natural basis always looms behind him. The mind of the Vedic poet is not the artist's mind which creates finished products. It is engaged too much in thinking about and constantly altering the wavering shapes of the gods, so that these remain to the end of Vedic

times too uncertain in outline, too fluid in substance for the remodelling hand of the artist. Macdonell has summarized the above discussion in one pithy sentence: 'Indefiniteness of outline and lack of individuality characterize the Vedic conception of gods.'

Along with the geographical, climatic and ethnological changes, there would naturally be changes in the gods themselves, reflecting as they did the changing environment and the experiences of the Aryan tribes. Thus, Varuna, the majestic god of the *Rgveda*, became later a night-god and finally only a god of oceans and waters; while, on the other hand, Indra, at first a 'Special god' was afterwards raised to the sovereign position. Like the Sun, the Vedic gods have their times of rising and setting. They appear over the horizon, go on waxing until they reach the zenith of their influence, then begin to wane in importance, and finally reaching the 'twilight' of godhead pass away for ever.

There are two ways of grouping the gods under various heads; (1) the Occidental and (2) the Oriental.

#### (1.) The Occidental way.

(a) Usener postulates three kinds of gods, namely:—

- (i) Momentary gods (*Augenblicksgötter*), i. e. the spirits which preside over any specific activity in the moment it takes place.
- (ii) Special gods (*sondergötter*): the conception of a single deity presiding over all similar activities, e. g. rowing in general.



- (iii) The final step to give a god personality and permit him to be developed thus in a myth, cult, poetry and art is furnished by language.
- (b) Prof. Bloomfield divides the gods in the following fashion :—
- (i) Transparent gods who are at one and the same time Nature objects and persons, or, to put it differently, they are the divine personifications whose naturalistic basis and whose starting point in human consciousness is absolutely clear.
  - (ii) Translucent gods who are the mythic formations whose structural outline may still be traced with a good deal of truth, although it is obscured by incrustations of secondary myths.
  - (iii) Opaque gods. Indra *e. g.* is the proto type of 'opaque gods' through whom it is very difficult—nay, even impossible—to trace their place in Nature.

## (2.) The Oriental way.

Indian scholars prefer to divide the gods with respect to the provinces they dominate. They include other minor divisions also. They are :—

- (i) Celestial gods like Dyaus, Varuna, Sūrya, Viṣṇu etc. who rule in the heaven.
- (ii) Aerial (or mid-region) gods like Indra, Vāta, Parjanya, Rudra, Maruts etc.
- (iii) Terrestrial gods like Agni, Soma etc.

- (iv) Minor gods of Nature like Rubhus, the Gandharvas, Divine implements, Spirits of Agriculture, Pasture etc.
- (v) Abstract deities like the Prayer, Passion etc
- (vi) Groups of Deities like Mitra and Varuna, Dyaus and Prthivi, Sūrya and Candramas
- (vii) Priests and Heroes raised to the position of gods; e g. Mātariśvan

The occidental method of dividing the gods is more exhaustive and psychological too.

Brilliance, power, beneficence and wisdom are the common qualities of gods. But the great gods often have their exclusive epithets. Thus the attributes 'Dhrtavrata,' 'Samrāj,' 'Asura' and 'Pasin' are peculiar to Varuna. Similarly the epithets 'Vasiraj,' 'Apsuyit,' 'Vritrahan' and 'Gopati' are characteristic of Indra. But owing to the henotheistic tendency (Henotheism or Kathenotheism means the belief in individual gods alternately regarded as the highest) of the Vedic worshipper, the attributes and the deeds of one god overlap those of the other. Thus, 'holding the heaven and the earth apart' has become a common exploit of both Varuna and Indra. So, there can be no consistent subordination of one god to another.

The Rgvedic gods are no exception to the dictum that man fashions his gods after himself. The statement is true not only as regards the external form but also as regards the habits and manners. The gods do bear the stamp of the characteristics of their makers, namely the Aryan tribes. The Rgvedic Indians though engaged in battles

ing. One poet tells us that there are 3339 gods, another reduces that number to 33 and the third one still less to 3. The final step is taken by a seer who unmistakably declares that there is only one Principle but the poets describe him as manifold (‘*ekam hi santam viprā bahudbā vadanti*’). This tendency also serves as the most fitting link between the extreme polytheism of the Vedas and the strict Absolutism of the Upanisads.

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royal with the native aborigines and even among themselves were in the main prosperous and contented with life. So, e. g., Indra is a jovial god essentially human in character. He is a great drinker and a mighty eater. The poets take pride in telling that Indra drank thirty lakes of Soma before he killed Vritra. The gods appear very like the Aryan tribal Heads. They could be bribed by whatever a man could be bribed. So the worshippers offered gods meat and profuse drink which, they knew, could appease even the haughtiest of men. No great stress is laid on the moral qualities of gods and the sense of sin is only very feebly represented in the hymns.

As regards the interrelations of the gods, it may be said that on the whole they are conceived as dwelling together in harmony and friendship, though there are a few exceptions. For example, Indra smote down Usha and her chariot. We expect to find many more clashes amongst the gods since there is no relation of rigid subordination among them. The existence of more than one independent Power is bound to lead to clashes and hearthurning. But, in any case, the exhibition of such clashes is skillfully avoided by the Vedic poets.

The god being the personification of a Natural force, the Rgveda has dozens and scores of gods in its varied descriptions. But does this polytheistic tendency continue throughout the Rgveda? No. The later Mandukas (I and X) do exhibit a marked tendency towards monotheism and monism. The poets had begun to understand that there is only one underlying Principle in all the varied Natural phenomena. This will be clear from the follow-

### 3. THE AGE OF THE RĠVEDA.

The theme of the essay is one of the most debatable points in the Vedic literature. The scholars have spilt an amount of ink on the topic, but no definite conclusion is arrived at, nor will it, we are afraid, be arrived in the future. The chief reason for this is that the contents of the Rġveda themselves furnish no evidence which can establish a conclusion acceptable to all. But one may well ask 'what is it that makes us solve the problem at all?' The importance of the age of the Rġveda can hardly be overestimated. If it be shown that the Rġveda is the earliest literary monument of the world, the Indian culture would consequently demand an ancient age and can repudiate its alleged loan to Babylonian culture.

The following are a few attempts—in worth, not more than mere guesses at truth—to solve the riddle

#### (1) Theory of Max Muller.

Prof. Max Muller put forth his popular theory in 1859. He began by saying that since the Buddhism constitutes a reaction against the Śrauta religion, the Vedas must be pre-Buddhist (500 B. C.). Again, the Brāhmanas, the Upanisads and the Sūtras come in succession after the Vedas. So, reasonably allowing two hundred years for the development of each of the Brāhmanas etc., the Samhitā period comes to about 1200 to 1000 B. C.

(2.) **Astronomical theory of H. Jacobi and B. G. Tilak.**

We find numerous astronomical data and calendar information in the Brāhmanas and the Sūtras. In these works Nakṣatras ( the Lunar Mansions ) play a prominent part. There are many passages in the Vedic literature in which it is ordained that such and such a sacrificial act shall take place when the Moon stands in conjunction with such and such a Nakṣatra. The present theory is based on the following observations.

(i) At the period of the Brāhmanas, the Pleiades ( Kṛttikā ) coincided with the vernal equinox. From the calculation of the value of precession it is evident that the case must be possible at about 2500 B. C.

(ii) But in Vedic Texts, traces of older calendar are to be found when the vernal equinox fell in Orion ( Mrgasīras ) which, by the same method, is possible at about 4500 B. C. Tilak, however, places the R̥k Samhitā as back as 6000 B. C.

(iii) H. Jacobi was confirmed by another astronomical observation. Gṛhyasūtras lay down that the bridegroom shall show his bride the Pole star called Dhruva ' the constant one ', and say ' Be firm in my home like this star. ' By a certain intricate theory in Astronomy, it is proved that one star after another slowly moves towards the North Pole and becomes North star or Pole star. But only from time to time does a brighter star approach the Pole so closely that it can, for all practical purposes, be regarded Dhruva or the constant one by people who saw with naked eyes. At present Alpha, a star of second

magnitude in Little Bear, is the Pole star. This star, of course, cannot be meant when the Pole star is spoken of in Vedic times, because only 2000 years ago this star was still so far removed from the Pole that it could not possibly have been designated the 'constant one.' Not until 2780 B. C. do we meet with another Pole star which merited this name. At that time Alpha Draconis stood so near the Pole for over 500 years that it must have appeared immovable to those who observed without any mechanical devices. This means that this custom in the Grhyasūtras prevailed at about 2780 B. C. And since the Sūtra literature presupposes the Upanisads and Brāhmanas, Rgvedic period of civilization lies before the third millenary B. C.

### (3) *The Discovery of Hugo Winkler.*

In 1907, Hugo Winkler found at Boghazköi in Asia Minor some clay tablets which contain the records of the treaties concluded between the king of Hittites and the king of Mitani in the year 1485 B. C. On these tablets there are names of the Vedic gods such as Mitra, Varuna, Indra, Nāsatyā etc. These names were written there in order to sanctify the documents. The natural conclusion from this is that the Vedas were known—nay, even regarded with great respect—in the 15th century B. C.

### (4) *The Linguistic Theory.*

There is a great affinity between the languages of the Avestā and the Rgveda. The linguistic features of these two religious texts prevent us from assigning a hoary age to the Rgveda. The date of the Avestā is approximately

fixed at about the 9th century B. C. This means that the Rgveda cannot be placed long before 1000 B. C.

#### (5.) Theory of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar.

He suggests that the inquiry should take its start from the word Asura. Assyria, he thinks, corresponds to Asuryāh as applied to Lokāh in the Iśāvāsyopanishad (verse 3) and may be regarded as meaning the country of the Asuras. Afterwards by a few not very clear steps, he arrives at the conclusion that the origin of the Rgveda Samhitā may be pushed as back as 2500 B. C.

#### (6.) Excavations at Mahan-jo-Daro.

**Books :—**Mahan-jo-Daro and the Indus Civilization: an official account of the Archaeological Excavations at Mahan-jo-Daro carried out by the Government of India between the years 1922-27. Edited by Sir John Marshall, G. I. E., Litt. D., Ph. D., F. A. S., etc., In three volumes with plan and map in colours and 164 plates. Vol. I text, chapters I-XIX with plates; Vol. II text, chapters XX-XXXII; Vol. III plates, London: Arthur Probsthain, 1931.

**Importance :—**Various archaeological, philological, ethnographical and historical interests have been accumulating round the work of excavation done at Mahan-jo-Daro, Harappa and other cities associated with the Indus Valley Civilization.

**Territorial Dimensions :—**The territorial dimensions of the problem have not yet fully declared themselves. But since the cities apparently connected with the same civilization extend far northwards into the Punjab, along



the Satlej even to within a distant view from Simla (pp. 91-3), Sir John Marshall seems to be justified in conjecturing that a like culture may have flourished throughout the Punjab and may have penetrated to the Valley of the Jamna and the Ganges.

**The Finds :—**At Mahan-jo-Daro 'the Mound of the Dead' about 25 miles in the north of the town of Larkhana in Sind, not far from the present bed of the Indus, a Buddhist Stupa was excavated in 1922. From that date the work of excavations has continued uninterruptedly. It has revealed at least seven strata of building above the present subsoil water level which still rises 10-15 ft above the ancient level of the plain; the lie of the city, with main streets north to south and east to west and many side alleys or thoroughfares; large houses of elaborate plan with walls still standing to a considerable height; an extensive public bath; culverts, drains and graves; and the multifarious objects illustrated in the plates. Architecture, masonry, pottery, figurines, statuary, stone vessels and seals, household objects, tools, utensils, ornaments, games and toys and many other things of technical interest are found in a large quantity. Besides these there are among the finds human skulls, copper and bronze objects, weights and measures and above all a plentiful collection of objects bearing script marks.

**Inferences :—**India stands on par with Egypt, Babylonia, Crete, etc, who claim to possess the oldest remains of civilization, i.e. about 3,000 B.C. As regards communications, it is noticeable that whereas Indus

Valley Seals have been found with relative frequency in Babylonia, no Babylonian or Sumerian seal has been unearthed at Mahan-jo-Daro. So evidences favour India influencing those countries rather than the contrary. There is no trace of *communication* by sea although the people seem to be good fishermen. They exhibit great skill in building houses. These are carefully designed with court yards, staircases, upper floors, bathrooms and drains; there were large sink pits in the streets to carry off both the refuse water and rain, which is shown to have been considerably more abundant than at the present time. The stage of civilization was that known as 'chalcolithic' when copper and bronze were in use, but stone and flint (also shell) was retained for many purposes. Gold and silver were the most familiar of all the *metals* though there are traces of tin and lead. There were several varieties of precious stones used to make beads for necklaces. *Stone sculptures* of human figures reveal a maturity on the level of the best Greek period. As for religion, they worshipped 'mother' earth as a goddess — a characteristic of all ancient African cultures. Phallism is fairly apparent. There is also a number of figures representing unquestionably a pre-Vedic worship of Siva who appears seated in Yoga-posture and attended by animals, Pasu-pati, as he is designated in later ages. So far there is nothing to suggest an extra-Indian origin of Indus civilization. Its origin may be attributed to Munda-Australasian race which inhabited India before the Dravidians came in or to the Dravidian race at the time when it entered India (about 3,000 B. C.).

The only possible side-light which the Mahan-jo-Daro Discoveries throw upon the date of the Rgveda is that these remains of the buildings, metals, paintings, script etc. demand quite an ancient age and that the period in which the said Culture thrived precedes even the age in which the earliest of the Vedic hymns were composed. The Siva worship (Phallism) and the Yogic postures shown in the sculptures are certainly pre-Vedic in nature. The scholars have now fully interpreted the documents found in the Excavations—the documents are written in a pictograph which resembles the Brāhmī script—and have come to the conclusion that the people who developed the said Culture must have belonged to a Race other than the Aryan one. Thus, then, we would not be justified in placing the Rgveda in an age which exceeds 3000 B. C. This date will be the *terminus a quo* though the *terminus ad quem* remains uncertain.

But hardly any of these theories is free from flaws. We mean to mention a few of them in most of these theories *serialim* :—

(1) The period of 200 years assigned by Max Müller for the development of each of the intervening works viz. the Brāhmanas, the Upanisads and the Sūtras, is quite arbitrary. Why not 500 or even 1000 years? Secondly Max Muller himself confesses that the period 1200 to 1000 B. C. is the least date of the Rgveda Samhitā and that 'no power on earth can tell the *terminus a quo* of the same.'

(2) The Astronomical theory seems to be sound and based on mathematical accuracy. But the texts on which

the superstructure of these scholars is based are ambiguous and, as Macdonell points out, are open to more than one interpretation. Thus it is very hazardous to raise castles on slippery grounds.

(3) Hugo Winkler's discovery can establish only this much that the Rgvedic deities like Indra, Varuna and others were known in the 15th century B. C. But it does not follow therefrom that the Rgveda Samhitā was composed at the very period.

(4) The linguistic theory fares no better. Though there be but a little difference between the languages of the Avestā and the Rgveda, we cannot deduce therefrom the removal of the Rgveda from the Avestā only by a few hundred years. The change in languages always depends on the nature of the languages concerned. For example, Latin has not undergone even a little change during the last 2000 years. So also our classical Sanskrit is practically the same for about 1500 years. Thus it is quite possible that there may be a gap of even one or two thousand years between the ages of the Avestā and the Rgveda.

(5) As regards the last theory, Sir Bhandarkar only claims to have thus simply indicated a new line of research. He never professed to have solved the problem fully.

(6) We have already said about the last topic.

What is then the purport of the above theories? One thing is clear that none of them has tackled the problem in all its bearings. Prof. Winternitz who is satisfied

with the Golden Mean shrewdly remarks: 'The more prudent course, however, is to steer clear of any fixed dates and to guard ourselves against the extremes of a stupendously ancient period or a ludicrously modern epoch. (One scholar has been bold enough to assign the Rgveda to the second century B. C.!).' However, according to the same scholar, we may put the degree of our ignorance between the following limits.

Beginning of the Rgveda Samhitā	}	From 2500 B. C. to 2000 B. C.
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The latest portions of the same.	}	From 1200 B. C. to 1000 B. C.
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#### 4. A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE INSTITUTION OF SACRIFICE.

##### (1.) The sacrifice as a gift

As is generally known, the Vedic pantheon is essentially a body of great and powerful gods before whom the worshipper realizes to the full his comparative weakness and inability to exist satisfactorily without their constant aid. By the most simple logic he applies to the Powers Divine the same principle which he applies to other more powerful men, or which is applied to him by his inferiors. He seeks to propitiate them by the process of giving gifts.

In the Rgveda and in the later period alike the cult of the gods is marked by the absence of any temple or house of the god, even of the simplest kind. There is no public cult, merely the carrying out of offerings for princes and other men wealthy enough to employ professional priests, and the performance of a much simpler cult by the householder himself. The essential form of the sacrifice is one which can be carried out under these circumstances and it reduces itself to the invitation of the god to come to the place of the offering, and to partake of the food and drink provided for him.

It was of course essential that the god invited should be received in a due place, and that any honours which were possible should be paid to him. Hence the hymns

of praise, the sound of music, and the dance : even perhaps the theosophical riddles—the so-called *Brāhmedyas*—with which at the great horse sacrifice the priests delighted themselves, and it may well be the god, since gods were conceived by priests in their own image.

The nature of the ordinary offering to the god is expressly stated to be an offering made to the god for the purpose of attracting his attention and good will, so that, delighted himself, the god may reward in the appropriate way his worshipper. The *Brāhmanas* bluntly state the doctrine of 'Give to receive' in so many words. The theory of the sacrifice and its result as an exchange of gifts, of strength for strength, is the fundamental fact of the whole Vedic religion.

Besides this form of offering in hope of favours to come, very small traces can be found of the offering which expresses grateful thanks for favours paid.

## (2) The sacrifice as a spell.

In the theosophy of the *Brāhmanas* it is an accepted fact that the sacrifice has a magic power of its own, and that it brings about the effects at which it aims with absolute independence : the old idea of the working upon the good will of a deity has disappeared. But even the later portion of the *Rgveda* shows a little trace of the belief in the magical efficacy of the sacrifice. The priests claim to control the gods, to capture them in the net of the sacrifice and make them do their bidding. The later literature went a step further and provided the *Brāhmanas* with magic devices in order to bind hard, e. g., the *Ādityas*.

until they yield what is desired, and Kutsa is said to tie up Indra in a disgraceful manner.

But the belief in the sacrifice as a magical device is not the primitive one; yet the Brāhmanas enable us to see clearly that the priests were determined to find in sacrifices throughout a magical effect. To every point some special working is attributed, and it becomes possible to secure ruin or prosperity for the sacrificer by the mere manipulation of some detail of no importance.

### (3.) The removal of sin by sacrifice and magic.

The sin-offering is only in essence a special form of the gift-sacrifice, the gift is offered to avert the wrath of the god: it seeks to produce in him not the positive action of furthering the welfare of the suppliant as is normally the case, but the negative attitude of sparing the guilty man. In its rudest form the chain of ideas must be that the food and the drink will delight the god, and thus he will forget his anger: such a view is based on one of the most primitive instincts of mankind: the hungry man is unlikely to forgo his wrath, while the soothing effects of meat and drink on humanity, however just its anger, and moral its indignation, are notorious. Sin is conceived to be something which sticks to a man, which confers a taint upon him as a disease does, and it is to be fought against in the same way as a disease: it may be banished by spells, water may wash it out and the fire may purify it. Moreover, as is natural, the concept of evil is of the widest possible kind: every sort of error in the sacrifice, every sort of out-of-the-way



occurrence in the life of the home and herds such as the birth of twins, every sort of strange occurrence in ordinary Nature, is made the occasion of an offering, and the Brāhmanas and still more the Sūtras pile up long lists of offerings under the rubric *Prāyascitta*, a term which is not yet found in the R̥gveda.

There is another set of practices connected with the removal of sin which consists of the declaration of one's sinful acts in the public. *e g* the murderer carries the skull of the dead man, drinks out of it, wears an ass's skin or the skin of a dog, which indicates him as a murderer to all and sundry and lives on alms, declaring to those from whom he begs, the crime which he has committed

#### (4.) Communion and sacrament in the sacrifice.

In the opinion of some scholars like S Reinach the origin of the gift sacrifice is totemistic

The gift theory of sacrifice is derivative, on the ground that it is really a faded remnant of the sacrifice in which the worshippers eat together of the flesh and blood of the deity, thus renewing and strengthening the bonds between themselves on the one hand and the god on the other.

In the conception of the sacramental communion there are clearly two elements which need not necessarily be combined. It is possible for the communion to appear by itself alone: the worshippers have thus a common bond in the food which they consume. In the second place, however, there may be more than this: the victim may be in

some way divine: the most developed idea will be found when the victim is imagined as actually being an embodiment of the god for the time being, but it may be that the victim is merely more or less affected by the divine spirit from the fact that the god comes to the place of the offering, and therefore that the divine spirit affects the victim and the place of offering. This conception partly accounts why in the Vedic ritual we find a considerable amount of evidence of the eating of the offering by the priests after the god has partaken of it. The same rule is transferred to the Grhya ritual: it is laid down that a man should eat nothing without making an offering of a portion of it; every meal when an animal is killed for a guest is a sacrifice.

The same efficacy of the sacrifice is to be seen in cases where the offering produces its result by contact, not by ordinary eating. Thus in place of eating food together the husband and wife may rub each other's hearts with the offering.

On the other hand, when the deities to whom the offerings are made are terrible, it is clearly natural that the offerings should be regarded as not suitable for human consumption, as *e.g.* in the case of offerings given to the Manes, Rudra and others.

Brāhmanas expressly state that man is the original victim and that other victims are substitutes. The victim was preferably an animal which was a theriomorphic form of the god, bulls to Indra, goats to Pūṣan and so on; the sex was assimilated and the colour chosen with regard to the nature of the god. Further, though the Vedic Indian

case of the occasional offerings, the worshippers first sacrifice to the god, before they partake of the fruits of the earth.

### (5) The Materials of the Sacrifice.

On the gift theory of sacrifice it is natural that man should offer what he delights to feed upon, and in point of fact this undoubtedly is the rule in the great majority of cases: the Vedic Indians practised agricultural as well as pastoral pursuits, and we find therefore that they offered to the gods, not only milk in several forms, such as curds or melted butter in several varieties, but also grain, barley and rice, which served to make different kinds of cakes, or were mixed with milk or curds to form variegated messes. These materials served to satisfy many needs, but the animal and the Soma offerings were of still greater consequence in the eyes of the priest, though they must have been numerically very few in comparison with the sacrifices of simple materials.

Brāhmanas set forth a list of five victims among animals, man, horse, oxen, sheep, and goats in practice the last three are the common victims, and the goat is most usual of all: wild animals, fish, birds, the pig, and the dog are excluded; the last two were not eaten, the others rarely, but it is possible that in their case practical difficulties may explain their exclusion from use.

The practice of assimilation is obvious and natural, it is not indeed strictly logical that, because a god is said to be a bull, he should eat huffs and so on. The colour and the sex of the victim had some connection with the nature of the deity.

source of life, and is anxious to attain as close a contact with them as possible. But immediate contact would be fatal and therefore an intermediary viz, a victim, is interposed by the priests.

The victim is dispatched to the other world, its Soul is liberated by death, with its own permission, for it becomes by the sacrifice a powerful being which no man would seek to irritate, and its body thereafter may be destroyed, whether by being consumed entirely by fire or by being eaten by the priest or the worshippers, or again its skin and other parts may merely be brought into close contact with the worshipper. Incidentally the sacrifice accomplishes much more than its mere immediate aim: if the victim offered by the consecrated man serves to secure him his close relationship with the gods, it also sends the spirit of the victim to strengthen and multiply the species. All sacrifice is thus essentially social: by the immolation of an individual it secures good for all.

Jevons insists that all sacrifice involves essentially the idea of drawing near to the god and making an offering to secure his favour, a step adapted originally when the community felt that its god was alien from it through the misconduct of one of its members, and had to be propitiated by tokens of repentance. At first, offerings are only occasional, evoked by the fear of the anger of the god, who, however, is recognized to be justly wrathful and to be also merciful and willing to forgive his worshippers, but the habit of solemn feasting on these occasions is gradually adopted in respect of the harvest fruits, when, as in the

The victim has to be killed, so that it shall make no sound and so that there shall be no effusion of blood: it seems to have been usually strangled. The omentum of the victim, a part rich in fat, is then extracted and offered up: thereafter the remaining parts are divided for offering, a rice cake is offered. The blood was left to the Rakshases, along with the excrements etc., of the victim.

The question of human sacrifice is of importance. The Śunahsepa episode in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa hints at the 'purusamedha' but the conclusion of the story leads us to think that the victim could be released. In many cases the human sacrifice may be only figurative as in the Purusa-hymn (RV. X. 90)

The most important of all offerings in the eyes of the people and the priest was certainly the Soma, as is proved by the fact that the Rgveda in the main is a collection based on the Soma sacrifice, though not exclusively devoted to it. The question of the origin and nature of the plant is insoluble and it is not found even now.

#### (6) Fire and Sacrifice.

The constant interrelation of magic and religion in the Vedic cult is seen in its most complete form in the position of the fire, which serves the double end of the mode in which the sacrifice is brought to the gods and the most effective agency for the banishing of evil spirits.

A further important function of the fire as used at the ritual is cathartic in a different way: at the end of the

offering, it is desirable to remove from possibility of human contact the apparatus of the sacrifice, which has been filled by its use at the sacrifice with a superhuman character and danger.

Thirdly the fire burns the omentum of the victim and produces a sweet smell which is very much liked by the gods. The Śrauta ritual demands not one but three fires and the time when the three were the mere expansion of the one is far behind the RV.: we find already there a distinction between the ordinary fire and the three fires of the more elaborate ritual.

### (7) The Performers of the Sacrifice.

It is an essential part of the Vedic sacrifice that it is a sacrifice for an individual, the Yajamāna, or sacrificer, who provides the means of the sacrifice and above all the rich rewards for the priests. Since the sacrifices involved a great expense, only kings, members of the royal house, high officials and rich merchants could afford to perform them.

There were not less than sixteen priests Hotṛa, Udgātr, Adhvaryu and so on, in big sacrifices. The actual process of the ritual will be very tedious and uninteresting to read; so we desist from giving it.

Sūdras except the Rathakāras and the Nisādas were not allowed to sacrifice. A woman took part in the sacrifice only in so far as she acted *qua* Yajamānapatni. On her own behalf she could not do anything independently.

In the later ritual, the chief duties of the sacrificer were of an inferior type: he had certain formulæ to repeat, he might perform the manual throwing of the offering into the fire, and he had various restrictions to undergo.

At the end of the sacrifice, big Dakṣiṇās were conferred upon the Brāhmaṇa-priests.

### (8) Rites ancillary to the sacrifice.

(1) The consecration. The Dīksā is a rite which has to be performed by the sacrificer and his wife before the Soma-sacrifice. It is carried out in a hut near the fire: the sacrificer has his hair cut, is anointed, puts on a fresh garment, is girded with the sacred cord, and sits down on a black antelope-hide, in which there resides, in the view of the tradition, holy power. He has also to abstain from food. When he has undergone all these restrictions, he is taken to be fit for the performance of the sacrifice.

(ii) In the end, there is an Avabhṛtha or 'Concluding bath.' It serves as an agent to remove the additional sacredness that is piled upon the Yajamāna by performing the actual sacrifice as well as the consecration ceremony.

The nature of the bath is further elucidated by the fact that through the performance of ablutions in them the waters become charged with magic potency and power: thus at the end of the bath at the horse sacrifice, those who go in, though evildoers, are released from all their sins.

(iii) **Taboos.** There are some restrictions which the Yajamāna must undergo. For instance, he must not bathe and donate ordinary gifts as long as he is in a consecrated state. He also must not have a sexual intercourse during that period even if his wife be 'Rtumatī' of that time. He must also observe silence, otherwise evil spirits would enter his open mouth. These are a few instances out of a host of others ordained by the Śāstras.

### (9) Later Reflections on the Sacrifice.

The section of the Veda which ordains various kinds of sacrifices is called the 'Karmakānda.' The sequel of this section is the 'Jñānakānda' consisting of the Āraṇyaka and the Upaniṣads. Especially the Upaniṣads and later works based upon these, such as the Bhagavadgītā, constitute the very antithesis of the sacrificial cult of the Brāhmaṇas. They (i. e. the Upaniṣads and the Gītā) embody a protest against the current practice of the sacrifices. They set forth the utter uselessness, nay, the mischievousness of all ritual performances and condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or hope of rewards which are, after all, transitory. The Gītā openly scolds (II. 42-44) such persons who hanker after the fruits of the sacrifices. Again in (IX. 20-21) it states that the fruits such as Svarga and others are no doubt obtained by these persons: they enjoy these as long as their 'Punya' is in ascendance; but when it is exhausted they again return to this mortal world and are engulfed in the chain of births and deaths.



The Brāhmanas of the Upanisadic times grew up to their patrons' higher needs and in the long run, their minds, which somehow, the *hocus-pocus* of the sacrifice had neither deadened nor satisfied, rose to those higher and permanent requirements which led to the practical abandonment of the sacrifice and to the lasting devotion to philosophic religion. Prof. Garbe passed a beautiful remark explaining the sudden change from the sacrificial cult to the philosophic speculation. 'All at once' he says 'lofty thought appears on the scene. To be sure; even then the traditional god-love, sacrificial-love, and folk-love are not rejected, but the spirit is no longer satisfied with the cheap mysteries that surround the sacrificial altars. A passionate desire to solve the riddle of the universe and its relation to one's own self holds the mind captive; nothing less will satisfy henceforth'. The Upanisadic Seers were bestirred to find out the sole Reality that underlies all the phenomenal dealings.

The question of the possibility of a release from individual existence which forms the cornerstone of the Upanisadic philosophy, presupposes the pessimistic view that all individual existence is a misery. Well, then, how is liberation (Moksa) from the bond (Bandha) possible? Not by works, (and sacrifices are essentially works), since they, either good or bad, demand a recompense; condition a new existence and are the cause of the continuance of the Samsāra; also not by moral purification (Samskāra), for this can only take place in an object capable of change, but the Ātman, the Soul, whose liberation is in question, is unchangeable. Therefore the liberation

cannot consist in a process either of becoming something or of doing something but only in the *knowledge* of something already present, that is hidden by Nescience. 'From knowledge, liberation (Jñānāt Muktiḥ).' After the Brahmanhood of the Soul is *realised* liberation follows at once; (the knowledge viz. 'That thou art' or 'I am Brahman.')

Simultaneously with the attainment of the knowledge of the identity with Brahman, the Soul becomes the Soul of the Universe.

This short review of the Upanisadic philosophy will show how the sacrifices, essentially involving 'Kāmya karmans', were put to banter.

Still later view viz., that of the Gītā, puts forth the theory that the sacrifices, as such, are not at all bad; it is the desire of the fruit and the egoism that 'I am the performer of the sacrifice and so on,' that are the disturbing and confining factors (Bandhakas)

The most modern ideas about the sacrifice are altogether different. We have realised that it is futile to burn the beasts and other materials for the sake of imaginary Svarga. Sacrifice is the individual sufferance of a minor thing in the service of some higher cause. For instance, we at times give up our personal interests for the amelioration of an institution, and so on.

The above short account will, we hope, give a clear idea of the origin and the evolution of the institution of sacrifice from the Vedic period to the modern times.

# QUESTIONS ON ŚĀṆKARA-BHĀṢYA.

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(II. 1 & n.)

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**Q. 1.** Summarize Śāṅkara's arguments against the doctrine of Samavāya.

**A.** Though there is only one Sūtra (viz. II. ii. 13) that directly brings in the refutation of the Samavāya doctrine, still Śāṅkara has spared no opportunity to condemn it wherever he got a chance to do so. In fact, the arguments against the Samavāya doctrine are scattered over the various portions of the Bhāṣya. The following are the arguments culled from the Pādas one and two of the Adhyāya no 2.

(1) If Samavāya, which according to you (i. e. the Pūrvaśikṣin viz the Vaiśeṣikas) is a distinct Dravya, is necessary to come in between two or more Samavāyins, there would result the contingency of non-finality in the following way.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & X & \\ A & / & B \\ \text{or } x_1 & / & x_1 \end{array}$$

Suppose A and B are the Samavāyins which are joined together by the Samavāya X. Now we urge that there must be a fresh Samavāya say  $x_1$ , to join the first Samavāya X on the one hand and the Samavāyin B on the other. The parity of reasoning would demand still more Samavāyas to join with the Samavāyins. If to avoid this contingency of non-finality you reply that there is no distinct Samavāya between the two, then there would be the contingency of the Samavāyins falling asunder.

(2) Secondly if the Kārya were to rest upon its constituent parts by means of Samavāya relation, we demand the way in which it (i. e. the Kārya) can rest upon its avayavas. There are only three ways in which it can rest. Taking the concrete example of a Ghata and the clay particles.—

(i) The Ghata is to reside on all the avayavas taken together;

(ii) The Ghata is to reside in such a way that each of its avayavas comes *seriatim* into contact with the corresponding avayavas of its cause, the clay;

(iii) The whole Ghata is to reside on each single constituent part, turn by turn.

But all these cases can easily be shown to be impossibilities.

In the first case there would be the contingency of the non-perception of the Ghata inasmuch as all the particles of clay in the Ghata are never seen by us in a single act of perception. In the second case there arises another difficulty. We shall have to suppose that the Ghata has two series of avayavas, one by which it attains the totality of the Ghata as a whole and the other by which its avayavas are to reside on the corresponding avayavas of clay. In the third case, while the bottom *e. g.* of the Ghata is having the jariness on it so that water does not leak downwards, its sides will have no jariness on them at the same moment and will therefore, as mere particles of clay, fall asunder. Thus there is no way possible in which the Ghata can reside on the clay particles by Samavāya relation.

(3) Again if one atom were to come into relation with another atom by means of Samavāya, we demand whether that atom thoroughly interpenetrates the other atom or only comes into partial contact with the other. Both the alternatives land us into difficulty. In the first, there arises a contingency that there can be no increase in the size of the resulting binary atom and in the second, your assumption of the impartiteness of atoms is thrown overboard.

(4) If to meet our first argument you urge that the Samavāya itself being a Nitya relation and being never seen apart from the Samavāyins, does not require a fresh relation to join with the things, we argue that Samyoga also being of the nature of a relation should not require any other relation (e. g. the Samavāya) to join with the Samyogins. If you still argue that Samyoga requires a fresh relation because it is Guna while Samavāya is a Dravya, we reply we have nothing to do with your technical terminology of Dravya and Guna. We can clearly see that the circumstances necessitating a distinct relation are equally present in the cases of both the Samyoga and the Samavāya. Thus in the doctrine of Samavāya there does arise the contingency of non-finality.

(5) Moreover your distinction viz. 'युग्मिदयोः संन्यः संयोगः' and 'अयुग्मिदयोः संन्यः समसयः' is merely a jugglery of words. For, the Kāraṇa e. g. the threads already exist before the Kārya viz. the cloth comes into existence. If you argue that the invariable concomitance is intended with reference to the Kārya alone, we ask 'how can the

'Kārya, which according to you does not exist prior to its creation, possibly come into relation with the Kāraṇa?' For, a relation always implies two existential entities. If you argue that the Kārya would just come into existence and at once come into अयुतासिद्ध relation with the Kāraṇa, we retort that the Kārya, at least in the moment of its origination, cannot effect any kind of relation with its Kāraṇa. And hence in that particular moment at least it has to stand apart from its cause. Thus your attempt at differentiating between the Samyoga and the Samavāya is only a play of words.

(6) Our main argument is that the Samyoga or the Samavāya can have no separate existence over and above that of the Sambandhins. For example, no Guna or Dravya is added on to the tree whenever a monkey comes to jump on it. If you mean to say that Samyoga and Samavāya must be taken to be two independent existential entities because the words Samyoga and Samavāya convey to us ideas which are quite distinct from the ideas conveyed by the words expressive of the Sambandhins, we demur. Samyoga and Samavāya are only two modes of looking at the Sambandhins. Again in ordinary dealings of the world we observe the use of many terms with reference to the same object according to its intrinsic or extrinsic predications. ( cf देवदत्त. एक सन् योगिन्यो वदान्यो बालो पिता... भाति ).

(7) Lastly if you were to argue that Samavāya must be posited in order to establish the relation of the abider and the abode between the Kārya and the Kāraṇa, we



reply that there would arise in that case the fault of Mutual Dependence ( *सामवेयसमसंशयः* ) in the following way —

- ( i ) कार्यकारणयोर्हि भेदमिदं आधिताश्रयभावमिति । and
- ( ii ) आधिताश्रयभावमिदं च तयोः भेदमिति ।

Thus your doctrine of Samavāya does not bear a close examination.

**Q. 2.** Briefly refute, after Śaṅkarācārya, the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists

**A.** Śaṅkara uses ten arguments in all to refute the Idealism of the Buddhists. Out of these ten, six are meant to break the lance of the Pūrvaśākin while the remaining four are Śaṅkara's own arguments to make the refutation more secure.

The first six arguments are :—

(1) We cannot really establish the non-existence of the external things, for, we actually see them. We do find objects like the pillar, wall etc., corresponding to the idea of each of them. If you argue by saying that the external objects do not exist over and above the ideas of the same, we rebut by pointing out that the object and the cognition of that object are essentially two distinct things. Even those who like to deny the existence of the external things surreptitiously admit their existence as they say 'Our idea presents itself as if it were an external object.' This *वक्ष्यते* evidently shows that there is no identity between the idea and the object.

(2) In establishing your conclusion, you have first taken it for granted that the external things cannot exist and then you have tried to show that no valid means of proof (Pramāṇas) go to prove its existence. But this is not the right way of arriving at the conclusion : for, प्रमाणप्रत्ययप्रकृति-  
इवेती सभावासम्भवी अस्यावेति, न पुन सभावासम्भवीरे प्रमाणप्रत्ययप्रकृति । And by this test we come to the conclusion that the external things do exist inasmuch as all the means of proof such as perception etc. vouch for their existence.

(3) Because the perceptive cognition has the same form as the external things, there is no reason why the object of that cognition should altogether be non-existent. For, if there were no objects, it would be meaningless to say that the ज्ञान has the same form as the object. Secondly, just as in the दृष्टज्ञान and पटज्ञान, the Ghata and Pata differ but ज्ञान as such is the same, so in other cases also the ज्ञान remains the same but the objects of that ज्ञान differ—a fact clearly establishing the difference between ज्ञान and its objects.

(4) सुद्वेषकमनसि cannot seek to establish the identity of ज्ञान and its object. For, the ज्ञान and its object are सुद्वेषक in the sense that they are related to each other as the end and means respectively. The object is a necessary means to ज्ञान.

(5) Next you cannot negate the विषय on the analogy of dream scenes etc. For there is a distinction between the experiences of the dream life and the wakeful life. For example, the experience in the dreams etc are later on contradicted when one gets up and finds that dream was

after all an illusion. Secondly the *स्मरणदर्शन* is merely a recollection of things while the *आत्मनिदर्शन* is a direct perception.

(6) If you deny external objects how do you account for the *ज्ञानवैचित्र्य*? Surely not on the basis of *आत्मनिवैचित्र्य*, for the *वासना*s themselves cannot exist since, according to you, the *वास्तव्य*s do not exist. Secondly, in order to explain the cause of a particular *वासना*, you will have to posit a previous *वासना* and this would further lead to a *regressus in infinitum*. Thirdly, there is no *सम्बन्ध* and *व्यतिरेक* relation between the *वासना*s and the *ज्ञान*s. For, there do arise some *ज्ञान*s *e. g.* the scorpion-bite, for which there are no *वासना*s at all. Lastly, *वासना*s are after all latent dispositions and as such require some substratum to rest upon. But no such substratum is obtained by any valid means of proof.

#### 4 Extra Arguments.

(1) Your *विज्ञान*s belonging to the preceding moment and the succeeding moment being momentary achieve their life-purpose only by announcing their existence so that there cannot obtain a relation of 'the perceived' and 'the perceiver' between any two *विज्ञान*s. This means that your fond classification of the *विज्ञान*s, *वास्तव्य* and *वासना* relation between the two *विज्ञान*s and the rest fall to the ground.

(2) We ask you "what is it that makes you affirm the reality of ideas alone?" If you argue that the *विज्ञान* alone can be felt, we reply that external things also are equally

felt. If you urge that the विज्ञान is self-luminous, not so the वादार्थः; we raise an objection that since you do not admit any enduring Ātman for whom the विज्ञान is to be luminous you will have to admit a fact which controverts the common experience of all viz. the agent's activity upon himself ( स्वात्मनि क्रिया ) such as e. g. fire burning itself. As regards our position, there cannot arise any अनवस्थादोष because when a particular विज्ञान is apprehended, no further desire to know the साक्षी of that विज्ञान arises.

(3) If you argue 'our विज्ञान is self-luminous and of the form of अनुभव i. e. self-consciousness' we reply 'No; even as the lamp requires some eye to cognise its illumination, so your विज्ञान also must require some enduring साक्षी unto whom the विज्ञान can reveal itself.'

(4) The साक्ष्यविज्ञान which according to you is the repository of वासनas cannot serve the intended purpose because it changes itself every moment. Unless one assumes one abiding entity enduring through all the three times or some one who is immutable and omniscient, such ordinary activities as the implanting of वासनas conformable to specific place, time and circumstances, and the evoking and joining together of memories would be impossible.

Finally, other defects pointed out in the refutation of the वाह्यादेवाद hold good *mutatis mutandis* in the case of विज्ञानवाद also (e. g. क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमः, उत्तरोत्पादे पूर्वनिरोधः and so on).

Q. 3. What is *श्रुतिप्रामाण्य*? Has Śaṅkara been able to explain the various contradictory Śruti passages as supporting his theory?

A. (a) To know *श्रुतिप्रामाण्य*, we must know the meaning of the Śruti and Prāmānya. Śrutis according to Hindus are the revealed texts not composed by any being, not even by the God. The four Vedas, the Brāhmanas and the Upanisads are generally regarded as constituting the Śruti texts. Prāmānya means the authoritative declaration on certain topics. For example, when the Veda ordains 'अग्निहोत्रं ब्रुवात्' we do not call in question the correctness of the statement but at once proceed to act accordingly. It is this implicit belief in the correctness of the Scriptural commands that characterizes a Hindu mind. Next a question arises as to the scope and limitations of the *श्रुतिप्रामाण्य*. The reply is as follows. Śruti is the sole authority in the case of all अनुष्ठेयवस्तुs like Dharma and Adharma, (for example, cf. धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादसद्गमनोपदेश्यं स्यात्) The main purpose of Śruti is to unfold unto us only such facts as are beyond the scope of ordinary Prāmānyas such as Perception etc. (cf. मत्पक्षादिप्रमाणानुपलब्धे हि विषये अपिज्ञेयादिसाम्यवशात्तत्त्वसंग्रहे श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं भवति, न मत्पक्षादिविषये, अदृष्टसंग्रहान्यत्वात्प्रामाण्यस्य । नहि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽमिमेकाश इति युक्तप्रामाण्यमुच्येति । Gita-Bhāṣya 18. 67 ).

But one may object 'Well, we do find sometimes Śruti meddling with Dṛṣṭa affairs e. g. 'अग्नेर्हिमस्य भेदजम्' and so on. Is Śruti void in that case?' The reply is that Śruti, if it appears to controvert ordinary experience,

is to be interpreted in such a way that its bearing would not be on every day matters. (cf. यदि (श्रुति) ब्रूयाच्छ्रुतीश्रुतिप्रकाशो वेति तथापि अर्थान्तरं श्रुतेर्विद्विन्नं कल्प्यम्, प्रामाण्या-  
न्यथानुपपत्तेः, ननु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा । *ibid.*.)

(b) The occasions when Śankara has to reconcile various Sruti passages as supporting his theory are the following.

(I) सदेव सेम्येदमग्र आसीत् or आत्मा वेदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्  
vs. असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् or असदिदमग्र आसीत् ।

Śankara gets out of the difficulty by saying that असत् here does not mean complete non-existence but it simply means a mass of existence which has not developed name and form. The reasons to take the meaning this way are two. (1) What was said to be Asat in the beginning is said to be Sat at the end of the very sentence. Again the सामानाधिकरस्य between इदं (which stands for the world) and Asat shows that Asat here does not signify complete void. For, surely, how can the existence come out of non-existence? (cf. Gītā. नास्त्ये विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः or Br. Sūtras II. 11 26 नास्त्ये दृष्टत्वात्). (2) Secondly, if Asat were to mean complete nothingness, what is the fun of saying 'असदासीत्'? Asat is Asat for all the three times

Remark We think Śankara has ably extricated himself out of the difficulty.

(II) स आत्मा, तत्त्वमसि श्वेतरोतो or सत्पृष्ट्वा तेद्वामुत्राविशत्  
vs. सता सेम्य तदा सपन्नो भवति or शरीर आत्मा मोहेनान्वाहृतः ।

The first group states the identity of the individual Soul with the Brahman while the second group states the superiority of the latter over the former. Sankara tries to get over the difficulty in the latter half of the *Rhāṣya* on Sūtra II. i. 22 अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्। He says that the distinction between the Jīva and the Brahman is like the distinction between Ghatakaśa and the totality of Ākaśa. Secondly when the *Abheda* between the two is realised (not merely theoretically understood) then all the difficulty is automatically solved (अपगतं भवति तदा जीवस्य भेदाखिलं, प्रज्ञानप्रसङ्गं.....तदा इत एव वृष्टिः कुतो वा द्वितीयकणादिकोः ।) But as long as the भेदव्यवहार goes on, the Brahman is certainly superior to the Jīva.

Remark. Sankara's explanation in this case is not very sound. His double-pouched procedure (i. e. पारमार्थिक and व्यावहारिक points of view) and overreadiness to wash off the distinction between the Jīva and the Brahman are not warranted by the wording of the Sūtra<sup>s</sup>. It seems clear that the Sūtrakāra was anxious to maintain the difference between the two. (e. g. भेदव्यपदेशात् I. i. 17 or अधिकोपदेशात् यादरायणस्यैवं दर्शनात् III. iv 8. ).

(III) परिणामश्रुतिः such as 'बहु रूपा प्रजायते' vs. निखण्डत्वश्रुतिः like 'अखण्डमनसु' or 'निष्कलं निष्किय...' etc.

Here we get two Śruti<sup>s</sup> which state that the Brahman modifies itself and yet remains impartite. How to solve the contradiction? Sankara likes to dispose of the परिणामश्रुति<sup>s</sup> as the following:—

‘न चेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था तदप्रतिपत्तौ कलानवगमात् ।  
न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते । पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण  
( वद्म ) सर्वव्यवहारतीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते ।’

**Remark.** By hook or crook ( e. g. पारमार्थिकेन etc. ) Śāṅkara essays to divorce the Brahman from the world. He is compelled to resort to such make-shifts ( i. e. changes in the point of view ) because he, by अनन्यत्व of Kārya and Kāraṇa, understands the complete merging of the Kārya into the Kāraṇa. ( cf. कारणव्यतिरेकेण कार्यस्याभाव इति गम्यते ). But Rāmānuja who by अनन्यत्व understands क्षरीरक्षरीर्यनन्यत्व does not fight shy of the परिणामश्रुतिः. According to him every object in the world is a real manifestation of the Highest. All Cit and Acit objects in the Universe form the body of the Lord. The Brahman is unitary in the sense that the body and the Soul form a unity. Śāṅkara's explanation in any case is not convincing.

**Q. 4.** Show with illustrations where Śāṅkara's commentary does not appear to reflect exactly the view of the Sūtrakāra.

**A.** Before giving actual illustrations from various Sūtras, we shall give a general formula to detect Śāṅkara's misrepresentation of the Sūtrakāra's intentions. Wherever we find Śāṅkara essaying to prove the illusory character of the world or to establish the identity of the Jīva with the Brahman, we should safely proscribe that passage as a misrepresentation. The very fact that the Sūtrakāra



describes the Brahman as the source of the world etc. (जन्माद्यस्य यतः B. S. I. i 1) shows that he wanted to invest the world with some significance and reality. As regards the second issue, there are clear references (e. g. I. i. 17, II. i. 22, or III. iv. 8.) which establish the distinction between the individual Soul and the Supreme Soul. Sankara is more faithful to the Upanisads than to the Brahma-Sūtras. To put it differently, Sankara might himself have been a better Brahma-Sūtrakāra though he is nowise a correct interpreter of the present Brahma-Sūtra. The following is an attempt to point out the doubtful places of misinterpretation in the Sāṅkara-Bhāṣya II, 1 and 2.

§ (α). Illustrations from Pāda 1.

(1) Sūtra 9, II. 23 ff. 'अस्ति चायमपरो दृष्टान्तो यदा स्वयंप्रसरितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्यात्, एवं परमात्मापि सत्सारमायया न स्पृश्यते इति'

(Vide also Sūtras 1 and 28 for the मायावीदृष्टान्त).

Remark. The majority of the older Upanisads do not contain the Vivarta illustrations. To establish one's thesis by resorting to Vivarta illustrations is simply to impose one's own views on the Sūtrakāra.

(2) Sūtra 9, II. 27, 28. 'मायामात्रं स्रष्टारमात्मनोवत्प्रामाद्य-मात्मनावभाषनं रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिमायेनेति.'

Remark. Here the रज्जुसर्पदृष्टान्त has the same appearance as that of the मायावीदृष्टान्त. The appearance of the word *Māyā* in the sense of 'illusion' is also suspicious. (cf. also the स्वप्नदृष्टान्त just above)

( 3 ) Sūtra 14, II. 159 ff. 'तदेवमायिद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्ष-  
मेवेत्यस्यैवमत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च न परमार्थतः '

Remark. Sūtrakāra's *Īśvara* is a more concrete and potent entity. It does not seem probable that such sort of *Īśvara* should depend for his essence (*vid.* the ईश्वरत्व, सर्वज्ञत्व and सर्वशक्तित्व) upon *अविद्यात्मकोपाधिः*. Again the conception of *Māyā* and *Avidyā* in the Sankarite sense belongs to a later date.

( 4 ) Sūtra 22, II. 16 ff. 'यत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुना वा हिता-  
करणादयो दोषाः । अविद्या...कृता हि भ्रान्तिर्हिताकरणादिरक्षणः संतारः, नतु  
परमार्थतोऽस्ति. '

Remark. Note in the first instance Śankara's changes in the point of view. Śankara tries to solve the problem of *हिताकरणादिदोषा* rather by force. He says that the *Jīva* and the *Brahman* are one and that the world does not exist so that all the problems, whether solved or unsolved, are no problems to him. But this is rather unworthy of a great dialectician like Śankarācārya. As we said in the beginning of this question ; to try to obliterate the distinction between the *Jīvas* and the *Brahman* is to hurl defiance in the face of the Sūtrakāra. Secondly one can readily see that the Sūtrakāra who is at great pains to establish the *Īśvara's* *Kāranatva* of the world cannot be willing to deny its existence altogether. More faithful interpretation would be like the following. Since the *Āgamas* vouch for the distinction between the *Jīvas* and the *Paramātmān* and since we hold that the *Paramātmān* is the cause of the world, our *Paramātmān* cannot be responsible for the *हिताकरणादिदोषाः*. At best they may apply to the *Jīvas*.

(5) The whole of the Sūtra 23 is wrongly interpreted by Śaṅkara. The obvious intention of the Sūtra is to prove the *inapplicability* of the हिताकरणादिदोष. But Śaṅkara by various illustrations proceeds to show the स्वरूपविचित्र्य, घर्मविचित्र्य and अर्गकियावैचित्र्य between the cause and the effect, which is properly the subject-matter of Sūtras 4-10. The more satisfactory interpretations of the Sūtra are :—

(i) Brahmananda Sarasyati's interpretation.

‘यथाऽमादिद्वयमण्यादिगतस्य मुक्तादिदिग्भ्यश्च तद्वत्तस्यामत्वप्रतीतिर्न तु मुक्तादेः, तथा अवियानिमित्तकृत्विद्यादिप्रतीतिर्भावे एव, न तु ब्रह्मगीत्यतस्तस्या वक्तव्यत्वेऽनुपपत्तिः ।’

(ii) Śrīkanṭha's and Rāmānuja's interpretation.

‘यथा अश्मादिषु ( अचिद्विद्भावे ) ब्रह्मोपपत्त्यवशेषानुपपत्तिः तथा चिद्विद्भावे जीवेषु सर्वथा ब्रह्मोपपत्त्यवशेषानुपपत्तिः ।’

(iii) Madhva's interpretation.

‘अश्मादेरेव जीवस्य ( चैतन्यवैयर्थ्यात्तद्व्याप्तौ ) स्वयःकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः ।’

(iv) Dr. Belvalkar's interpretation.

We hammer and chisel stones in order to transform them into the *images* of gods. The process of hammering is extremely painful, but it elevates the stone to a superior position. Similarly the so-called miseries and restrictions of life are meant for the elevation of the Soul and he need not chafe at them. Hence there is the inapplicability of हिताकरणादिदोष because there is no real अहित at all.

Remark. The last interpretation, though not supported by tradition, seems to hit the exact point of the Sūtrakāra.

(6) Sūtra 27, II. 44 ff.

‘नचेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनायां, तत्त्वतिपत्तौ फलानवगमात् ।’

Remark. Śāṅkara fights shy of the परिणामश्रुति because his point to prove is that the Vikāras and naturally this world are absolutely false. But the Sūtrakāra, and Rāmānuja for the matter of that, have no point in explaining away the परिणामश्रुति. According to them, every little thing in this world—whether Cetana or Acetana—is a real manifestation of the Brahman.

(7) Sūtra 33, II. 11 ff

‘नाप्यपश्रुतिस्त्वत्पश्रुतिर्वा, सृष्टिभूतेः सर्वज्ञभूतेश्च । नचेय परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः ..... अविद्याकल्पितनामरूप ..... इत्येनदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम् ॥’

Remark. Śāṅkara's explanation up to ‘सृष्टिभूतेः सर्वज्ञ-भूतेश्च’ is quite in keeping with the Sūtrakāra's intention, but it looks rather awkward when Śāṅkara at once turns back and says ‘नचेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः’ and so on. सृष्टिश्रुति is certainly significant for the Sūtrakāra. Again here we not only come across the changes in the point of view but also the typical formula of Śāṅkara 112. अविद्याकल्पितनामरूप .. etc. All these make-shifts of Śāṅkara seem to go against the view of the Sūtrakāra.

Illustrations from Pāda 2.

(8) Sūtra 3, II. 13 ff.

‘II. i. 24—इत्यत्र..... स्वाश्रयं कार्यं भवतीत्येतत् लोकदृष्ट्या (No. 1) निदर्शितम् । सास्त्रदृष्ट्या (No. 2) तु पुनः सर्वदेव... न पश-  
यन्ते ।’ (परमार्थदृष्ट्या (No. 3) तु जगन्मिथ्येव ।) (Our wording).

Remark. Just note the infinite number of *दृष्टि*s the learned Ācārya has. It is now an open secret that Śaṅkara, when cornered, at once changes his point of view. But this looks rather strange while discussing the Ultimate Reality. The multifarious *दृष्टि*s of the Ācārya leave us in a flux of mind and prevent us from grasping the real intention of the Sūtrakāra.

(9) Sūtra 32, II. 3 ff.

‘अपिच बाह्यार्थविशामभ्युपगम्यतेतद्विरुद्धमुपदिष्टता सुगतेन स्वर्ग-  
कृतमात्मानोऽसंख्यमव्ययत्वं, प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु, विरुद्धार्थमतिपक्षदा विमुक्षेपु-  
रिमाः प्रजा इति ।’

Remark. It is simply unbelievable that the Sūtrakāra, while refuting a system, would make such an uncharitable mention of the founder and propounder of that system, especially in the case of Buddha who claimed to have been filled with the milk of pity not only for the suffering humanity but for the whole Universe. Śaṅkara's charge ( *viz.*, प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु ) merely shows his own abusive nature and brings disgrace to the reputation of the Sūtrakāra.

(10) Sūtra 45, II. 3 ff.

‘वेदविमतिपेक्षत्र भवति.....इत्यादिवेदनिन्दादर्शनात् ।’

Remark. The Sūtrakāra would never have pointed out वेदनिन्दा as the defect of the Pāñcarātra system, for there is really no वेदनिन्दा in that system. As Rāmānuja correctly points out, the words of dissatisfaction with the Vedas put in Sāṅdilya's mouth are intended merely बक्ष्यमाणविद्याप्रवर्तार्थे

and not for वेदनिन्दा. Śankara has certainly missed his mark when he points out this flimsy defect. Note in this connection the following caustic remark of Rāmānuja on Śankara.

‘यथैव केषांविदुदोषाः.....वेदविरुद्धं तन्प्रमिति, सोऽयनाप्रातर्वेदवचसा  
ज्जनाकलिततदुपबृंहणन्यायकलापानां श्रद्धामात्रविजृम्भितः ।’

### § (b) Doubly-interpreted Sūtras.

The second broad division where the misinterpretation of the Sūtras may, with good reasons, be suspected is the doubly-interpreted Sūtras. Wherever there is a double interpretation of a Sūtra, one fact becomes clear viz. that the Bhāṣyakāra is not quite sure of the intention of the Sūtra in question. Secondly there is a possibility of either of them being wrong, (in the sense that it may not be intended by the Sūtrakāra). And a logical extension of this doubtful position is: ‘May there not be still a third interpretation really intended by the Sūtrakāra?’

And if this be true, both the interpretations proposed by the Bhāṣyakāra may not be meant by the Sūtrakāra.

The following are the doubly-interpreted Sūtras in Pādas 1 and 2 of Adhyāya no 2.

#### (1) Sūtra II. i 15. ‘भावे चोपलब्धेः ।’

Śankara proposes to read the Sūtra as ‘भावोपलब्धेः’. This reading might be suggested to him by the संन्यसरिस no. 9 whose fourth Pāda is ‘वागभावाय सत्यार्थम्’. Śankara’s proposed reading is certainly decisive and forceful but his envious critics have accused him roundly of wilful perversion

e. g. Vallabha remarks 'इदं सूत्रं मिथ्यावादिना ( i. e. मायावादिना संकरेण ) न ज्ञातमेव । अत एव पाठान्तरकल्पनम् ।'

( 2 ) Sūtra II. ii. 35. 'न च पर्यायादप्यावितोषो विकारादिभ्यः ।'

In the first interpretation, the word 'paryāya' means 'by turn' 'alternately'. In the second it denotes unending succession.

( 3 ) Sūtra II. ii. 36. 'अवस्थावस्थितेऽभिमयनित्यत्वादवितोषः ।'

1st interpretation. ( अवस्थिति = ) एकदशीरपरिमाणतैव ह्यान्त्रोपचितावचितदशीरान्तप्रस्थिः ।

2nd interpretation. ( विषयवस्थापु ) अवस्थितपरिमाणः एव जीवः ह्यात्, सतश्चाविशेषेण सर्वदेव अणुर्महान्वा जीवोऽप्युपगन्तव्यो न शरीर-परिमाणः ।

( 4 ) Sūtra II. ii. 39. 'अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ।'

अधिष्ठान = (i) Material like mrd etc. upon which the Agent is to operate.

= (ii) Material body (Sarīra).

( 5 ) Sūtra II. ii. 40. 'करणवत् चेन भोगादिभ्यः ।'

करणवत् = (i) Like the organs such as Uakṣas etc.  
(ii) Possessing the Karuṇa: e. body etc.

§ (c) उत्सृजभाष्यम्.

उत्सृजभाष्य is really a contradiction in terms for a Bhāṣya according to its definition means the exposition of the Sūtras in terms always conforming the wording of the Sūtras. ( cf. सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुसारीभिः । ). But the

Bhāṣyakāras often transgress their limitations and indulge in the so-called उत्सृज्यभाष्य. These portions of the Bhāṣya are very useful to determine the philosophy of the Bhāṣyakāra himself. But this means that these portions may propound views which the Sūtrakāra did not even conceive. उत्सृज्यभाष्य occurs in the following places in our prescribed text.

(1) The last portion of II. ii. 10. The discussion of the relations between तस्य, तापर, तप्ति etc.

(2) Sūtra II. ii. 17. The discussion of Ayutasiddha things and of the untenability of the doctrine of Samavāya.

(3) Three of the four extra arguments used by Śaṅkara in the refutation of the Buddhist Idealism,

1st. Sūtra, II. ii. 28. ll. 63-66.

2nd. Sūtra, II. ii. 28. ll. 67-81.

3rd. Sūtra, II. ii. 28. ll. 82-91.

Thus, the three broad divisions viz. §s (a), (b), and (c), exhaust all the doubtful places of misinterpretation in our prescribed text.\*

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\*Numbers of Sūtras and lines refer to Dr. Belvalkar's edition of the *Brahmasūtra—Śaṅkara—Bhāṣya*.



# KAUTILĪYA-ARTHAŚĀSTRA.

*Date and Authorship of the Arthaśāstra*

## ‘THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHORSHIP AND THE DATE OF THE ARTHASĀSTRA.’

The tradition assigns the authorship of the Arthasāstra to the credit of Kauṭilya, the well-known Prime Minister of Chandragupta. This view is supported by two facts.

(a) There are dozens and scores of references in Sanskrit literature vouching for Kauṭilya's authorship of the Arthasāstra and for the identity of Kauṭilya with the Premier of Chandragupta. *e.g.* :—

(1) Viṣṇupurāṇa narrates ‘नैव ताम्रदान् कीदृश्याः  
ब्राह्मणः समुत्प्रेष्यति...कीदृश्या एव चन्द्रगुप्तं राज्येऽभिषेक्षति।  
(XXIV, 6-7.)

(2) Kāmandaka (300 A. D.) confesses that his ‘Nītiśāstra’ is an epitome of Kauṭilya's work on Arthasāstra and regards Kauṭilya his Guru.

(3) Mudrā-Rākṣasa points in the same direction.  
‘यस्याभिचारवज्रेण वज्रज्वलनतेजसः।

एषात मूलतः भीमानुपपदां नन्दपर्वता ॥

एतन्की मन्त्रद्वयस्या यः शपत्वा शक्तिधरोपमः।

आनन्दर नृपन्द्राय चन्द्रगुप्ताय मेदिनीम् ॥

(b) Secondly, the Arthasāstra itself contains some references to its author. *e.g.* :—

- (1) मुसप्रहणविदेयं तत्त्वार्थपदनिश्चयम् ।  
कौटिल्येन कृतं शास्त्रं विमुक्तग्रन्थविस्तरम् ॥ \* ( p. 6 )
- (2) सर्वशास्त्राण्यनुनम्य प्रयोगभुषणम् च ।  
कौटिल्येन नरेन्द्रार्थे शासनस्य विधिःकृतः ॥ ( p. 75 )
- (3) येन शास्त्रं च शास्त्रं च नन्दराजगता च भूः ।  
 अमर्षेणोद्भूतान्थाद्यु तेन शास्त्रमिदं कृतम् ॥ ( p. 431 )

But the European scholars who are generally averse to concede the early date of Sanskrit works try to relegate these verses to the realm of spurious interpolations. But in the present case at least they cannot put forth this stock-in-trade argument. Because this supposition lands us into two difficulties. Firstly, as pointed out by Jacobi, 'if they ( i. e. the above verses ) are taken out, then the customary metrical conclusion will be wanting in the chapters concerned.' Therefore these verses have got to be taken as the integral parts of the text. Secondly, this assumption involves the fault of Mutual Dependence ( इतरेतराश्रयदोषः ) Thus the spurious nature of the verses would be proved only when the Arthasāstra is proved to belong to a later date by means of independent arguments and the later date of the Arthasāstra would be established when these verses are proved to be spurious interpolations.

But there are other grounds on which the European scholars—prominently, Jolly, Keith, and Winternitz—

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\* Numbers of pages or chapters refer to the Mysore edition of the Arthasāstra

deny the identity of Kautilya with the Premier of Chandragupta. Their main arguments are :—

(1) A busy man like the Maurya minister could not possibly find time to write such a fat volume on a subject which comprises diverse branches of knowledge.

(2) In the *Arthasāstra* itself there is not the slightest reference either to Chandragupta or to Pataliputra, his capital.

(3) Kautilya mentions himself in the third person (इति वीक्ष्यः) not less than 72 times. This makes one infer that Kautilya also, like other authorities mentioned in the *Arthasāstra* such as Viśālākṣa, Parāsara etc., might be a third party and not the author himself.

(4) The account given by Megasthenes, who being the Greek ambassador at the Court of Chandragupta is expected to have more authentic knowledge of the Mauryan rule, does not tally with that given by Kautilya.

(5) Kautilya, while quoting the requisites of the preparation of alchemy, mentions one substance which contains mercury. But mercury was not found before 400 A. D.

(6) The verses in the *Arthasāstra* are quite similar to those of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* in their form and technic, showing thereby that the author of the *Arthasāstra* could not have lived before the Christian Era.

(7) The pedantic and elaborate divisions of the *Arthasāstra* lend colour to the view that the *Arthasāstra* is the work of one or more Pandits rather than that of the

very practical Prime Minister of Chandragupta. Politicians are always inclined to countenance the thumb-rules rather than the scholastic elaborations of polity.

(8) The general appearance of the Arthaśāstra suggests that it is rather the work of a school than that of an individual author whether you like to call him an ordinary man in the street or the Prime Minister of Chandragupta.

A careful reader, however, cannot fail to find that all these arguments of the Occidental scholars are more or less trumpery. We shall now try to show how these arguments fall to the ground *seriatim* :—

(1) This is the weakest of these arguments. There are other parallel examples. For example, Śaṃsa the Prime Minister of the king of Vijayanagar could find leisure to write a stupendous commentary on the Vedas.

(2) There is really no logical necessity which can compel Kautilya to mention Chandragupta or his capital, Pataliputra. The fact of non-mention merely evinces the universal applicability of the work. We are, however, going to show in our own independent arguments that there are some indirect references to Chandragupta.

(3) Kautilya's reference to himself in the third person cannot rule out the possibility of his being the author of the work. In India, the author's mention in the third person is a piece of literary etiquette. Mention in the first person, according to Indian authors, always indicates the immodesty and the self-assertiveness of the author.

(4) We are going to show in the sequel that the accounts given by Megasthenes and Kautilya do tally as regards the important items. And even if there be any discrepancies in the minuter details, we cannot afford to forget the fact that Megasthenes was, after all, a foreigner and that a small degree of inauthenticity in his account is bound to be there. We need not on that score take poor Kautilya to task.

(5) In the first place, we deny that mercury was not found before 400 A. D. It might have been found even earlier by the Indian Alchemists. Secondly, the text on which the scholars have raised this superstructure is open to more than one interpretation and does not restrict us to take the word necessarily mean mercury.

(6) This argument has no probative value since the dates of the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana themselves are not yet beyond the pales of discussion.

(7) The divisions of the Arthashastra may be numerous owing to the diversity of topics discussed, but they are not at all pedantic. On the other hand there are grounds to suppose that the author was a very practical politician and not merely a political theorist. For example, the sentence 'अथ यस्मादने हि मनुष्या नियुक्ता वनेषु विहरन्ते' shows the author's deep insight into the nature of man. The following are a few quotations which countenance the same view:—

(1) अन्तरिक्षे हि मत्ता सौम्यवद्वारे वसन्ते । (Chap. 19)

(2) मनुष्ये नान्ये मन्त्रावकीर्तयिष्यन्ते । (Chap. 31)

( 3 ) जातिभूमिषु च दृश्याणामविक्रयः । ( Chap. 40 )

( 4 ) कोशपूर्वा साररम्भाः तस्मात्पूर्व कोशमवेक्षेत । ( Chap. 26 )

Lastly, we are inclined to believe that the Prime Minister of a great emperor must surely have more chances to derive a thorough information of multitudinous departments of the State than a Pandit especially in an age in which there can be only few possibilities of knowing the state of politics from books.

(8) This final argument of the Opposition lays the axe at the root of the question. If it be proved that the Arthashastra is not the work of an individual then the contention that the Prime Minister of Chandragupta is the author of the work automatically falls down for the simple reason that he also is an individual. But we are saved from accepting this unwelcome position by the following observations :—

- (i) Kautilya often refers to his predecessors, 'a fact which betrays the critical tendency unmistakably suggestive of an *individual author*.'
- (ii) Profuseness of criticism, want of sequence and contradictions in the Arthashastra seem ordinarily to be the faults of an individual writer. In school-books a great care is taken to round off the angularities of the text
- (iii) Kautilya refers to schools by using a plural number ( *eg* साम्नाः, वाहस्पत्याः etc. ) and to an individual author by a singular ( *eg* आद्वजः, पिप्पलः etc. )

- (iv) Kautilya puts forth the views of various schools and authors neither in their chronological order nor in the order of their worthiness. 'The arranging of the Ācāryas in such an arbitrary order is possible only to a great Master and not to one or more writers of text-books.'

The fact is that the Book begot the school and not the school the book.

We have thus at length refuted the arguments of the Western scholars. But mere refutation of the objections does not necessarily mean the establishing of our thesis viz., that the author of the Arthasāstra is Kautilya, the well-known Prime Minister of Chandragupta. Uptil now we have shown that the author of the Arthasāstra must himself be a great politician and not merely a political theorist. Now our endeavour will be to show that it is quite possible for the author to be a contemporary of Chandragupta.

The following are our own positive arguments to establish our thesis :—

(1) There is a striking similarity between the accounts given by Megasthenes and Kautilya. c. 9 :—

- (i) Fragment 34 of Megasthenes' 'Indica' closely resembles the 'Adhyakṣapracāra' in the Arthasāstra. For instance, the sentence 'of the great officers of the State, some have charge of the market, others of the city, others of the soldiers' from 'Indica' has its analogue in the



Arthaśāstra in the chapters on Panyādhyaksa, Nāgaraka and Senādhyaksa respectively. The same is the case with other officers referred to in 'Indica'.

- (ii) Indica's reference to elephants 'turning the scale of victory' has a parallel in the sentence 'hastipradhāno vijayo hi rājñām' ( p 50 ).
- (iii) Indica states that every department was headed by a Board of temporary officers. Kautilya also says: 'hastyaśvarathapādātamanekamulhyamavaasthāpayet' ( p. 57 ) He speaks of temporary officers in chapter 27 while discussing the qualities of the officers.

(2) The Edicts of Aśoka compare favourably with the account given by the Arthaśāstra. For example, both of them ordain that cakravākas, sārīkās, hamsas and dātūhas shall be exempted from slaughter. The Zanāna system (Purdah system) which is indicated by the word 'केलेष्वने' (R. Ed V) is also referred to in the Kautiliyam ( Sūtrādhyaksa p 114 ) 'यायानिस्तान्निः' etc.

Nay, there are reasons to believe that Kautilya lived even earlier. Aśoka in his edicts prohibited the holding of the 'Samājas' or the so-called convivial meetings ( cf. 'न च सम्राजः कर्तव्य, बहूँ हि दोषं समाजेषु पश्यति देवानां प्रिय.' ) Now the Samājas were the joyous meetings where wine could be distilled by any persons. But by the time of Aśoka, these Samājas seem to have defeated their original purpose and were looked upon rather as the opportunities for com-

mitting atrocious deeds. On the other hand, Kautilya has no such hostile attitude towards the same. He freely allows distilling on such occasions. (cf. उत्सवसमानयनाच्च चतुस्सोरिको देयः Chap. 42). Kautilya also speaks of the 'cārastris' when the citizens could wander through the city even at mid-night. Does this not show that Kautilya lived in the earlier stages of Social development than Asoka?

(3) The system of currency (panas etc.) mentioned by Kautilya was current in the days of Pāṇini (cir 500 B. C. cf 5. 1. 29-34.) But Deenara and its subdivisions seem to be in vogue by the time of Patañjali (cir. 200 B. C. cf. Smṛti-candrikā p. 231.)

(4) There are some indirect references to Chandragupta in the Arthashastra e. g. :-

(i) अग्रणीतो हि (दण्डः) मात्स्यम्यायमुद्रावयति । यत्नीयानयत हि यस्यैतं दण्डधराभावे । तेन गुप्तः प्रभवतीति । (Chap. 1, p. 9.)

(ii) विद्याविनीतो राजा हि प्रनाम विनये सतः । अनन्यां पृथिवीं मुक्ते सर्वभूतहिते सतः ॥ (Chap. 2, p. 11.)

(5) There are some linguistic irregularities which might mean that Kautilya lived in an age when the rules of Pāṇini had yet to establish their indomitable sway. For example, Kautilya uses the words 'पाणिन' and 'अव्यय' which, according to Pāṇini, should be 'पाणिनु' and 'अव्ययम्'.

(6) Last, but not least, the general Social condition painted by Kautilya is quite in keeping with the early date to which we are going to ascribe the book. There is nothing in the Arthashastra to show that the Buddhism

had played havoc with the Śrauta religion. Reference is often made to the temples of Varuna, Joyanta, Vaisravana etc.—the old Vedic deities. The Paurāṇic deities such as Rama, Kṛṣṇa, Śiva etc., seem to have obtained no significant position in the days of Kautilya. To a modern scholar, the atmosphere of the Arthasāstra appears to be quaint and misty.

In the foregoing discussion, we have tried to establish two facts viz., that the author of the Arthasāstra must himself be a great politician filling a high office of the State and that it is quite possible for him to live in the days of Chandragupta. Adding to these the support of the tradition, the present writer is led to believe that Kautilya, the Prime Minister of Chandragupta, should be the author of the Arthasāstra.

Once we agree to look upon the Prime Minister of Chandragupta as the author of the work, the problem of its date remains no longer difficult. For, Chandragupta ruled from 321 to 298 B. C and consequently the date of the Arthasāstra goes as back as the first quarter of the fourth century B. C. No cogent reasons have yet been put forth which can dislodge us from our present conclusion.

The importance of this early date can hardly be over-estimated. We are proud to note the satisfactory state of Indian civilisation even at such a staggering antiquity. This date also helps us to repudiate India's alleged indebtedness to Greeks and others as regards Equity, Law and general civilisation.

